Lawmakers as Job Buyers by De Barbieri, Edward W.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 1 Article 2 
2019 
Lawmakers as Job Buyers 
Edward W. De Barbieri 
Albany Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward W. De Barbieri, Lawmakers as Job Buyers, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 15 (2019). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol88/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 15 
LAWMAKERS AS JOB BUYERS 
By Edward W. De Barbieri* 
 
In 2013, Washington State authorized the largest state tax incentive for 
private industry in U.S. history.  It is not remarkable for a state legislature 
to use tax benefits to retain a major employer—in this case, the global 
aerospace manufacturer Boeing.  Laws across all states and thousands of 
cities routinely incentivize companies such as Amazon to relocate or remain 
in particular areas.  Notably, however, Washington did not recover any of 
the subsidies it authorized despite Boeing’s significant post-incentive 
workforce reductions. 
This story leads to several important questions:  (1) How effective are state 
and local legislatures at influencing business-location decisions?; (2) Do 
such incentive programs actually achieve their goals of increasing and 
maintaining jobs?; (3) Is the public protected from imprudent spending?  
This Article looks specifically at the role of state and local governments in 
encouraging businesses to locate in their jurisdictions.  In such cases, state 
and local lawmakers act as buyers of jobs. 
This Article argues for a two-step proposal to limit subnational 
government actions to incentivize business-location decisions.  The first step 
involves a bidding process where companies are awarded incentives based 
on the lowest subsidy dollar amount required to create or retain a job of a 
certain quality or pay rate.  The second step involves defining job metrics 
based on certain preconditions and recapturing incentives should a company 
fail to maintain or achieve a defined number of job and qualities inherent in 
each job.  This two-step proposal has regulatory benefits and it mollifies the 
political concern for jurisdictions to appear competitive and the need for 
public financial protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Washington State legislature adopted the largest state tax 
incentive program for private industry in U.S. history.1  The governor’s 
office estimated that the almost $9 billion in tax incentives, in this case for 
aerospace manufacturers, would yield $21 billion in economic activity.2  
Only a few years after the incentives were adopted, however, Boeing, the 
largest aerospace company in the world and the state’s largest employer, 
reduced its workforce in the state by 17,466 workers.3 
The governor and legislators from both political parties sought to compel 
Boeing to return a portion of the tax incentives after the company reduced its 
workforce.4  Yet, without statutory employment targets, lawmakers were 
unable to claw back the subsidies.5  In the end, the legal process to incentivize 
a company to remain and expand its workforce caused a significant loss in 
employment to tens of thousands of families.6  Several years later, it is clear 
 
 1. In this instance, legislators in Washington State acted to keep a new plant set to 
manufacture Boeing’s new aircraft, the 777X, from relocating outside the state.  To do that, 
Washington extended tax incentives, set to expire in 2024, through 2040.  Specifically, the 
legislature added the following text to state tax laws: 
It is the legislature’s specific public policy objective to maintain and grow 
Washington’s aerospace industry workforce.  To help achieve this public policy 
objective, it is the legislature’s intent to conditionally extend aerospace industry tax 
preferences until July 1, 2040, in recognition of intent by the state’s aerospace 
industry sector to maintain and grow its workforce within the state. 
S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. § 1(3) (Wash. 2013) (enacted).  This subsidy program tops 
the list of the largest state and local subsidy programs to private industrial company 
developments, excluding sports stadiums and other major entertainment projects. PHILIP 
MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, MEGADEALS:  THE LARGEST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
SUBSIDY PACKAGES EVER AWARDED BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 6 (2013), www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/megadeals_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E244-9T6R]. 
 2. The specific tax incentive program was valued at $8.7 billion and estimated to result 
in $21 billion in economic activity over sixteen years. Andrew Garber, Legislature Approves 
Tax Breaks to Secure Boeing 777X, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013, 7:04 PM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/legislature-approves-tax-breaks-to-secure-
boeing-777x/ [https://perma.cc/9PBK-U2GD].  The political reality underlying the incentive 
extension is clear:  as one strategist put it, “governors [who] deliver Boeing jobs win 
reelection.  Period.” Reid Wilson, Boeing Machinists Agree to 777X Contract on Narrow Vote, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/01/04/ 
boeing-machinists-agree-to-777x-contract-on-narrow-vote/ [https://perma.cc/33UJ-YW36]. 
 3. Boeing now reports 17,466 fewer workers in Washington State from a high of 83,295 
when the tax plan was approved to 65,829 in 2018. See General Information:  Employment 
Data, BOEING, https://www.boeing.com/company/general-info/index.page#/employment-
data [https://perma.cc/G744-AHW6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019); Alwyn Scott, Washington 
Lawmakers Nix Bill Linking Tax Breaks to Boeing Jobs, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2016, 4:55 PM), 
https://reut.rs/2OxdrG1 [https://perma.cc/C6N4-64WX].  
 4. The bill’s original text only allowed Washington State to recapture the incentives “[i]f 
a significant commercial airplane manufacturing program is not sited in the state of 
Washington . . . .” See Wash. S. 5952 § 2(1). 
 5. Reductions in total workforce or jobs numbers were not considered in the bill 
language. See id. 
 6. The unfortunate reality is that the Boeing 777X plant was built but the labor will 
largely be robotic. Dominic Gates, At Boeing’s 777X Wing Factory, Robots Get Big Jobs, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 26, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
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that the bill failed as measured against the incentive package’s stated intent 
to “maintain and grow jobs in the aerospace industry in Washington state.”7 
This vignette is but one instance of state lawmakers using tax incentives 
to attempt to buy jobs.8  Amazon’s public competition to locate its second 
headquarters and its decision to pull out of a proposed location in New York 
City9 are widely reported examples of this frequent phenomenon.  Often, 
efforts to create new jobs result in relocating jobs from a neighboring state 
or defensive spending to prevent interstate job competition.10  Current 
estimates of state and local business incentive spending range up to 
$80.4 billion per year.11  One dataset lists almost 400 commercial and 
industrial real estate projects that each received over $50 million in state or 
local subsidies since approximately 1980.12  State and local government debt 
has ballooned alongside this increased spending.  Excluding employee 
retirement funds, state and local government debt has swollen from $21 
billion in 1950 to over $3 trillion today.13 
Two common tools used by state and local government to spur economic 
development activity are job-creation tax credits and property tax 
abatements.14  Governments use these tools, along with bond issuances and 
even local land-use approvals, to induce companies to create jobs and invest 
 
aerospace/at-boeings-777x-wing-factory-robots-get-big-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/WAD8-
P6YF]. 
 7. See Wash. S. 5952 pmbl.; see also General Information:  Employment Data, supra 
note 3; Scott, supra note 3.  
 8. The federal government is largely agnostic about state and local government subsidies 
to private companies competing with companies from neighboring states. State ex rel. Ohio 
Cty. Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 5 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely, C.J., concurring) (discussing 
existing federal tax law as “an invitation to states to subsidize their own citizens competing 
with the citizens of other states”).  Commentators have observed that such subsidy programs 
amount to elected officials buying jobs. Editorial, Amazon’s Golden Fleecing, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 14, 2018, 6:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazons-golden-fleecing-
1542230916 [https://perma.cc/5YU4-YDUR] (“The worst actors here are the politicians who 
pose as job creators but are essentially job buyers.”). 
 9. J. David Goodman, Amazon Pulls Out of Planned New York City Headquarters, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/nyregion/amazon-hq2-
queens.html [https://perma.cc/3ZKE-ZKDY]. 
 10. Episode 699:  Why Did the Job Cross the Road?, NPR:  PLANET MONEY (May 4, 2016, 
10:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2016/05/04/476799218/episode-699-why-
did-the-job-cross-the-road [https://perma.cc/9ZBC-RANY] (investigating the phenomenon of 
cross border job poaching in Kansas City, Missouri and Kansas City, Kansas). 
 11. Louise Story et al., Explore the Data, N.Y. TIMES (2016), 
http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/12/01/us/government-
incentives.html#home [https://perma.cc/A8ZA-ZQ8R]. 
 12. See generally MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1. 
 13. State and Local Governments, Excluding Retirement Funds; Debt Securities and 
Loans; Liability, Level, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLGSDODNS 
[https://perma.cc/Z4U6-Y2J6] (last updated June 6, 2019). 
 14. TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, W. E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP’T RESEARCH, A NEW PANEL 
DATABASE ON BUSINESS INCENTIVES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFERED BY STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2017). 
2019] LAWMAKERS AS JOB BUYERS 19 
capital.15  Job creation and capital investment through building construction 
and equipment installation grow state and local government tax bases.16 
The political benefits to providing major employers with financial 
subsidies are clear.17  Elected officials act within their authority to halt job 
losses when faced with a plant closure and the prospect of constituents losing 
their employment.18  Similarly, to appear competitive, elected officials enact 
legislation to lure new jobs by attracting businesses to grow or diversify a 
state’s economy.19  Both Texas and Florida, for example, authorize their 
governors to close deals with companies seeking to relocate to another 
state.20  Politically, these programs shield legislators when a group of 
workers faces job cuts or a community lobbies to incentivize an employer to 
relocate from outside the state.21 
Economic development activity by state and local government has serious 
risks.  Governments risk bankruptcy should incentives become too costly.  In 
a recent example, incentives to automakers in Michigan brought about a 
significant state fiscal crisis.22  In other cases, governments may be 
financially liable if a development deal falls through.  New York State spent 
massive amounts of public money through its failed Empire Zone Program 
for projects that were either never built or did little, if anything, to grow the 
 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. C. Tyler Mulligan, Economic Development Incentives and North Carolina Local 
Governments:  A Framework for Analysis, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (2013) (discussing 
local government cash grants to private companies to grow tax base). 
 17. For an excellent discussion about how those companies and individuals with political 
power benefit their own financial interests, see BRINK LINDSEY & STEVEN M. TELES, THE 
CAPTURED ECONOMY:  HOW THE POWERFUL ENRICH THEMSELVES, SLOW DOWN GROWTH, AND 
INCREASE INEQUALITY 12–13, 28–31, 153 (2017) (“[P]olitical power consists of the ability to 
win distributional struggles over fixed resources.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 2 (regarding Governor Jay Inslee’s apparent political 
calculation to keep Boeing jobs in Washington State as a means of ensuring constituent 
support). 
 19. For example, 238 cities pitched proposals to attract Amazon’s second headquarters, 
each with their own local incentives to appear competitive. Amazon News (@amazonnews), 
TWITTER (Oct. 23, 2017, 7:41 AM), https://twitter.com/amazonnews/status/ 
922473078805762048 [https://perma.cc/6G4Z-QUEY]. 
 20. The Texas Legislature created the Texas Enterprise Fund to allow the governor to 
negotiate directly with businesses on awarding job-creation tax credits.  The law requires an 
award agreement that includes the number of jobs that will be created and a deadline for the 
creation of the jobs.  It also requires repayment if the jobs are not created by the appropriate 
deadline. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019).  Florida’s Quick Action Closing 
Fund is similar.  However, the bill’s text includes criteria for making an award.  Specifically, 
the economic benefit must be 5:1 (five dollars of benefit for every dollar of incentive) and jobs 
must pay at least 125 percent of the average private sector wage in the state or area. FLA. STAT. 
§ 288.1088 (2018). 
 21. Legislatures are politically insulated because, at least in these two states, it is the 
governor’s office that bears responsibility should a particular deal fall through. 
 22. Michigan was forced to negotiate a cap on tax incentives with the “Big Three” 
automakers following a strain on the state’s $10 billion general fund and a $325 million 
midyear budget cut. See Chad Livengood et al., Value of GM’s State Tax Credits Remain 
Secret, DET. NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015, 10:19 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/ 
politics/2015/12/15/general-motors-mega/77352724/ [https://perma.cc/6PW4-UPV8]. 
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economy.23  In 2009, St. Louis, Missouri transferred building rights for 1500 
acres of land to one developer for a project expected to develop the tax base.  
But thus far it has only has resulted in a single gas station and grocery store.24 
Areas that devote significant public resources to business location 
incentives often struggle with other public investments such as school 
funding.25  Michigan, while a leader in public spending for business location 
incentives, lags in school-spending growth.26  Predominantly African 
American school districts such as those in Detroit and Flint suffer from 
conscious decision-making that separates opportunity based on geography.27 
Legal constraints originally emerged to protect the public and governments 
against the catastrophes associated with economic development activity gone 
awry.  The public purpose doctrine—the principle that public funds should 
not go to private parties without a public purpose—emerged in the mid-1800s 
following public investments in speculative railroad construction.28  Around 
 
 23. Tim Knauss, Empire Zones, NY’s Failed Aid to Companies, Still Costing Taxpayers:  
$3 Billion Plus, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug. 9, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://www.syracuse.com/ 
state/index.ssf/2017/08/empire_zones_nys_failed_aid_to_companies_keep_costing_taxpayer
s_3_billion_plus.html [https://perma.cc/P48P-8TUN] (“I’ve never done a study on Empire 
Zones . . . .  I would say the empirical evidence . . . suggests that what we were doing, we 
should not be doing,” said the current head of New York State’s economic development 
agency.). 
 24. Jacob Barker, St. Louis Wants to Cut Ties with Northside Developer Paul McKee, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 13, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/st-louis-
wants-to-cut-ties-with-northside-developer-paul/article_88ba714f-10be-5665-be8a-
e3df35f5e341.html [https://perma.cc/2CSG-7A3C]; David Nicklaus, With Northside Stalled, 
It’s Time to Rethink City’s Development Approach, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (July 1, 2018), 
https://www.stltoday.com/business/columns/david-nicklaus/with-northside-stalled-it-s-time-
to-rethink-city-s/article_51c04811-0979-58da-9586-e5c82fd674a1.html 
[https://perma.cc/6T7Z-GNVZ].  
 25. Michigan, for instance, ranked last among states in total education revenue growth 
from 1995 to 2015. DAVID ARSEN ET AL., MICHIGAN SCHOOL FINANCE AT THE CROSSROADS:  
A QUARTER CENTURY OF STATE CONTROL 1, 7 (2019), http://education.msu.edu/ed-policy-
phd/pdf/Michigan-School-Finance-at-the-Crossroads-A-Quarter-Center-of-State-Control.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6VSN-AN8M]. 
 26. Id. at 1. 
 27. RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER:  URBAN GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL AGE 243 
(2016). 
 28. The legal academic scholarship on the public purpose doctrine begins with a focus on 
government’s inability to levy taxes but for public purposes. Francis W. Bird, The Evolution 
of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. 
REV. 37, 43 (1913) (“[T]he fundamental law restrains a state legislature from authorizing the 
issuance of bonds in aid of a private purpose.”); Breck P. McAllister, Public Purpose in 
Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 137, 137 (1930) (“It was to curb governmental expenditures that 
the doctrine of public purpose was first used in state court . . . .”); Howard Lee McBain, 
Taxation for a Private Purpose, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 185, 185 (1914) (discussing the maxim that 
public authorities may not levy taxes for private purposes).  More recently, scholarship has 
focused on the expanding importance of subsidizing economic development by government. 
See generally Martin E. Gold, Economic Development Projects:  A Perspective, 19 URB. LAW. 
193 (1987) (discussing different state and local governments’ economic development projects 
and the legal constraints they face, most notably from the public purpose doctrine and state 
constitutional prohibitions); Martin E. Gold & Lynne B. Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight 
in Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119 (2011) (focusing on the role of “blight” in 
state and local government condemning property through eminent domain for economic 
development purposes after Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
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that time, many states and the U.S. Supreme Court drastically limited state- 
and local-government wealth redistribution to private companies both 
through public purpose doctrine litigation and state constitutional 
amendments prohibiting such actions.29 
Today, state- and city-government spending on economic development 
activity is enormous.30  Courts barely constrain payments for such 
programs.31  One recent study of litigation brought between 1994 and 2014 
indicates that, in almost all cases, courts would not limit government outlays 
based on public purpose claims or related state constitutional prohibitions.32 
Scholars who have studied government support for private economic 
development activity have proposed reforms.  Substantive proposals have 
ranged from a focus on how projects impact communities33 to compelling 
courts to use agency law instead of contract law principles in evaluating 
public purpose cases.34  Scholars have suggested procedural reforms too.  
One procedural proposal would give state attorneys general more oversight 
over investigating subsidy programs.35  Another procedural proposal argues 
for only allocating public funds for economic development activities through 
nonprofit corporations.36 
 
 29. State and local spending was never banned completely.  For instance, a leading mid-
1800s case held that public support for private railroads could serve a public purpose. 
Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 169 (1853) (“A railroad is a public highway for the 
public benefit . . . .”).  Other aid schemes to private companies were less favored by courts.  
The first U.S. Supreme Court case to discuss the public purpose requirement in the 
government’s economic development activities was decided in 1874. See generally Loan 
Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874) (holding that a city bond to be paid to a private 
ironworks company for bridge building was an illegal payment to a private corporation). 
 30. See Story et al., supra note 11.  There is no single definition of the term “city.”  It is 
used interchangeably throughout this Article with the term “local” to encompass substate 
government, including, for instance, county, city, town, or other political subdivision. 
 31. Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution:  State Fiscal Limits and State 
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 945 (2003) (“[T]he public purpose requirement as 
a constraint on legislative action is a dead letter today.”). 
 32. See generally Brian Libgober, The Death of Public Purpose (and How to Prevent It) 
(Harvard Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 63, 2016), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Libgober_63.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7PS-BUMN] (discussing a correlation, though not causation, between the 
decrease in the filing of public purpose doctrine cases and an increase in state and local 
government debt). 
 33. Comment, The “Public Purpose” of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 
70 YALE L.J. 789, 802 (1961) (arguing that courts ought to consider safety precautions, plans 
for disposal of industrial waste, transportation congestion, impact on public services, housing, 
and psychological tensions when considering the effects of a government financed industrial 
facility).  “The argument for finding a public purpose becomes weaker if, for example, no 
provisions have been made for increased traffic, housing needs, sewerage disposal or health 
requirements.” Id. 
 34. See Libgober, supra note 32, at 5. 
 35. See, e.g., Daniel J. Munoz, AG to Probe $11 Billion in NJ Tax Breaks, NJBIZ (Jan. 
14, 2019, 3:57 PM), https://njbiz.com/ag-to-probe-11-billion-in-nj-tax-breaks/ [https:// 
perma.cc/CP5K-S848] (describing a recent example of the attorney general’s investigation of 
state economic development subsidies). 
 36. See Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, The Corporation Profits:  The Emasculation of 
the Public Purpose Doctrine and a Not-for-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311, 1313 
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Against all of this background rests the theory behind how subnational 
governments interact with, and encourage, private business investment.37  
While often overlooked, states and cities play important administrative and 
regulatory functions in shaping business-location decisions.38  A significant 
critique, however, is that governmental incentives to influence private 
business location selection are much more specious than most anticipate.39 
The simplest and most elegant solution to constraining subnational 
economic development spending is to limit such spending only to the types 
of public-works projects that are traditionally the sole realm of state and local 
government.40  Such a limitation, however, is unlikely to be acceptable given 
that economic development spending is currently viewed permissively.41  An 
intermediate step that both protects the public fisc and allows states and cities 
to spend money on economic development is a process with both procedural 
and substantive checks. 
First, states and cities ought to consider a reverse auction approach to 
rationalize the subsidy-allocation process.42  A reverse auction allows a seller 
to sell a predetermined amount of goods or services for the lowest price 
buyers are willing to pay for everything on sale.  For example, Google used 
 
(1994) (“[A]n examination of the historical development of the Public Purpose Doctrine 
establishes that the proliferation of . . . public subsidies . . . is unconstitutional.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Timothy J. Bartik, Business Location Decisions in the United States:  
Estimates of the Effects of Unionization, Taxes, and Other Characteristics of States, 3 J. BUS. 
& ECON. STAT. 14, 14–21 (1985). 
 38. See Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 484 (2009) (“[C]ities have recently engaged in a 
flurry of efforts to redistribute capital, place conditions on it, or limit its entry.”). 
 39. SCHRAGGER, supra note 27, at 2 (“But how much of a city’s economic health is or can 
be attributed to the decisions made by city leaders is quite uncertain.”); Richard C. Schragger, 
Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 
313 (2009) (“[W]e do not have a consensus account of how cities form, develop, and grow or 
decline.  Thus, any claim that one policy or another will generate local economic growth 
should be made with a great deal of skepticism.”). 
 40. Public works include infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, water and sewer facilities, 
and the like. 
 41. See Gold & Sagalyn, supra note 28, at 159.  Courts have long deferred to legislatures 
in interpreting the meaning of a public purpose. Kalkowski v. Neb. Nat’l Trails Museum 
Found., Inc., 826 N.W.2d 589, 598 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (“[I]t is for the Legislature to decide 
in the first instance what is and what is not a public purpose, for the purposes of expenditure 
of public funds . . . .”).  Encouraging economic and industrial growth through indirect 
activities like marketing and advertising expenditures is a public purpose. Id. 
 42. The government uses auctions to sell goods or services that it otherwise would need 
to set a price for. See ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS:  UPROOTING 
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY 50 (2018).  Online advertising providers, 
like Google’s AdSense, use auctions to determine what ads will appear to a given user. About 
the Ad Auction, GOOGLE:  ADSENSE HELP, https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/ 
160525?hl=en [https://perma.cc/J3TE-ATBM] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). Online reverse 
auctions are commonplace in industrial procurement both for government and most major 
industries. Sandy D. Jap, The Impact of Online Reverse Auction Design on Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships, 71 J. MARKETING, Jan. 2007, at 146, 146.  Jap notes the importance of buyers 
in designing reverse auctions to maintain relationships with suppliers. Id. 
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a reverse auction in its initial public stock offering.43  The initial price for a 
single share was set at the lowest price that all shares would be sold following 
a bidding process.44  Frequent flyers on commercial airlines are familiar with 
efforts to engage passengers on an oversold flight to fly at a later date in 
exchange for vouchers towards future travel using a reverse auction.45 
Here, the reverse auction process is similar.  State or local government 
economic development agencies would announce a reverse auction proposal 
process.46  Private employers are invited to bid on public incentives, such as 
job-creation tax credits.  Employers bid on the dollar amount of job-creation 
tax credits that they would require to create full-time, or full-time-
equivalent,47 positions.  The reviewing economic development agency would 
consult the bid list and award subsidies for the lowest amount of subsidy-per-
job created until all of the budgeted subsidy funds are spent.  Agencies could 
consider additional metrics, such as industry sector, amount of compensation 
per employee, and a residency requirement for the employees. 
Second, recapture mechanisms linked to specific job numbers (retained or 
created) ought to be included in the contracts awarded through the bid 
process.  This way, governments can precondition the release of funds based 
on specific, targeted, and predetermined metrics, and they can claw back 
funds spent on companies that accept subsidies but let workers go anyway.  
Governmental subsidy administrators may use clawback provisions to deter 
company flight based on particular community economic needs.48 
There are potential benefits to involving state and local government in the 
economic development process using these two steps.  Beyond ensuring 
public law norms, like openness, transparency, and accountability, the 
“publicization” of economic development activity allows for subnational 
governments to effect policy priorities.  States and cities already exert 
regulatory control when contracting for construction services, by, for 
 
 43. Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods:  Book Building Versus Auctions 
with Endogenous Entry, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 615, 616 (2005). 
 44. Id. at 629–30. 
 45. The Hub Team, Introducing New Customer Options for Flexible Travel Plans, UNITED 
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://hub.united.com/united-new-customer-travel-options-
2507483285.html [https://perma.cc/4CHM-LXLX]. 
 46. Government purchasing is typically regulated by state procurement laws. See, e.g., 
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 163 (McKinney 2019).  Such laws often detail how bidding shall occur 
and under what circumstances—such as in a state of emergency, when such bidding processes 
may be suspended. 
 47. Individual agencies have the flexibility to craft their specific programs to reflect either 
full-time positions or several part-time positions combined to equal a full-time equivalency. 
 48. A recent academic work in political science and economics also suggests clawing back 
business location incentives for noncompliance as at least part of the solution to curbing abuse 
in such incentives. NATHAN M. JENSEN & EDMUND J. MALESKY, INCENTIVES TO PANDER:  HOW 
POLITICIANS USE CORPORATE WELFARE FOR POLITICAL GAIN 201 (2018) (“Clawbacks can thus 
police fraud or legitimate poor performance of investments, but they do not address that many 
incentive dollars are duplicative, wasted on firms that would have come anyway.”).  Currently, 
community benefit agreements and other regulatory tools allow communities or governments 
to negotiate and contract for such specific economic benefit terms with private companies. 
See, e.g., Edward W. De Barbieri, Do Community Benefits Agreements Benefit Communities?, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2016). 
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example, requiring a percentage of companies to be owned by women, racial 
groups traditionally excluded from business ownership, or disabled 
veterans.49 
State agency bidding for economic development is not uncommon.  Tax 
credits to spur the creation of affordable housing—low-income housing tax 
credits (LIHTCs)—are issued by state agencies through an allocation process 
that is a form of bidding.50  State housing agencies develop Qualified 
Allocation Plans to distribute LIHTCs.51  The LIHTC program itself is facing 
a crisis since private developers created over 80 percent of affordable housing 
units—units which will revert to private ownership following the expiration 
of the tax credits and possibly lead to increased evictions for low-income 
renters.52 
A two-step reverse auction and clawback proposal could permit small 
employers to band together and make collective proposals for jobs and 
commercial real estate subsidies.  Typically excluded from the largest 
subsidy projects, many small, start-up businesses are kept out of the 
economic development subsidy market.  The proposed two-step approach 
invites smaller firms to work together to grow and collectively hire more 
workers.53 
This Article starts out by analyzing the ways in which state and local 
officials use law to act as job buyers, often to the detriment of the public.  
Part I begins by discussing current legal tools available to states and cities to 
subsidize economic development.  Next, Part I discusses competition and 
other political arguments advanced to support public wealth redistribution to 
private companies.  Finally, this Part addresses the fiscal risks of 
unconstrained economic development spending.  Part II then discusses 
current doctrinal and constitutional constraints on economic development 
spending, the ineffectiveness of the same, and existing scholarly substantive 
and procedural suggestions to constrain such spending. 
This Article then analyzes avenues for legislatures and courts to constrain 
redistribution of public funds to private companies.  Part III introduces two 
primary steps that elected officials should consider—and the judiciary ought 
to focus on—in reviewing such activities.  The first step involves 
encouraging the use of reverse auctions to ensure that states and cities use the 
 
 49. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 313 (McKinney 2019). 
 50. Brandon M. Weiss, Locating Affordable Housing, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 215, 221 (2018). 
 51. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[S]uch amount was allocated pursuant to a qualified 
allocation plan of the housing credit agency which is approved by the governmental unit . . . 
of which such agency is a part.”). 
 52. Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing, 10 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 521, 545 (2016). 
 53. While the two-step approach described here is novel, state and local governmental 
support for small firm job buying is not.  New York State, for instance, replaced its failed 
Empire Zone program, see infra note 120, with a program designed specifically to incubate 
start-ups. New York State Certified Business Incubators and Innovation Hot Spots, N.Y. ST.:  
EMPIRE ST. DEV., https://esd.ny.gov/certified-business-incubator [https://perma.cc/7TBJ-
T7L2] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).  The author directs a pro bono legal services program that 
partners with one of these incubators. 
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least amount of subsidy possible when buying jobs.  The second step involves 
substantive analysis to ensure that laws provide clawback mechanisms tied 
to the actual number of jobs created or retained.  Part IV applies the two-step 
proposal to existing programs used in Washington, Texas, and Florida. 
The relationship between subnational governments and private businesses 
should be reassessed.  Legal scholars ought to be skeptical of such 
governments setting industrial policy.54  Because economic development 
programs do not appear to be going anywhere anytime soon, in the interim, 
alternatives to the status quo should be considered. 
States and cities should have companies bid for subsidies.55  A bidding 
process with definable job goals ensures that proposed economic 
development activity best meets the public purpose as outlined by the 
legislature, interpreted by the agency reviewing the bids, and, ultimately, 
reviewed by the courts.56  The two-step reverse auction and clawback 
proposal argued for here is simpler, easier, and results in a more efficient 
redistribution of scarce public funds for needed economic development.57 
I.  ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LAW:  SUBSIDY TOOLS AND RISKS 
A.  Taxes, Bonds, and Local Land Use 
To create an effective reverse-auction and recapture process for economic 
development subsidies, governments must change their current method of 
financing job-buying.  There are a number of tools available to states and 
cities to engage in economic development activity.  These tools largely 
involve authorization via state legislation.58  Taxation and bond issuances are 
the most common tools for revenue generation.59  At the local level, land-use 
 
 54. For a broader discussion about scholarly skepticism of cities setting industrial policy, 
see generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 27. 
 55. There have been other market-based proposals in the realm of urban economic 
development. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1465, 1468 (2008) (proposing a legal system for owners in a neighborhood to collectively 
decide whether the land should be assembled for development into a larger parcel). 
 56. By analogy, this process would work similarly to the way that projects are reviewed 
for environmental impact.  The state or local government follows development guidelines in 
an environmental impact statement.  Public hearings occur and written comments are 
accepted.  As long as the state or local government agency follows the guidelines, a court will 
likely uphold the environmental impact statement process. See generally Ordonez v. City of 
New York, No. 450100/2018, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 11, 2018). 
 57. An empirical proposal of this sort is not alone in its effort to reform an otherwise 
wasteful political process.  Scholars have argued that court analysis of gerrymandering cases 
would benefit from an efficiency gap analysis where courts look to see how many votes for 
either political party are wasted in a given district. See, e.g., Nicolas O. Stephanopoulos & 
Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 
834 (2015). 
 58. S. 5952, 63d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2013) (enacted); Gold, supra note 28, at 
207. 
 59. Richard Briffault has pointed out how state constitutions contain the primary fiscal 
constraints for state and local governments. Briffault, supra note 31, at 908 (“[S]tate 
constitutions accord extensive consideration to state and local spending, borrowing, and 
taxing.”). 
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approvals are common to induce companies to relocate, remain, and expand 
operations in specific communities.  Governments can spend by doing 
everything from the direct purchase of private corporation shares60 to the 
construction of commercial property, which then gets leased to private 
interests.61 
1.  Taxation:  Tax Exemption, Job-Creation Tax Credits, and Property Tax 
Abatements 
States and cities frequently grant tax exemptions to spur private economic 
development.  As discussed above, in 2013, the Washington State legislature 
extended aerospace tax preferences and expanded exemption of sales and use 
taxes for new plants manufacturing aerospace-related products.62  The tax 
exemption was extended specifically on the condition that Boeing build a 
new manufacturing line—though not necessarily hire or retain a certain 
number of workers.63 
Job-creation tax credits, on the other hand, are tax benefits directly 
connected to creating jobs and increasing payroll.64  New York State’s jobs 
tax credit program, called the Excelsior Jobs Program, conditions the 
issuance of credits based on the amount of funds companies plan to invest, 
as well as the particular type of industry in which the company operates.65  
Amazon was expected to receive $1.2 billion in Excelsior Jobs Program tax 
credits for its new headquarters in Long Island City, New York.66 
Cities frequently exempt local property taxes to encourage business 
relocation and commercial real estate development.67  The Excelsior Jobs 
 
 60. See Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 173, 175 (1853) (upholding the purchase 
by a city of shares in a railroad corporation). 
 61. Briffault, supra note 31, at 919–20 (“[S]tate or local government enters into an 
arrangement with a private firm or public authority bond issuer to lease the bond-financed 
facility for a period of time, with the government’s lease payments covering the annual debt 
service.”). 
 62. See Wash. S. 5952 § 1.  The legislative findings of such an act of the legislature will 
prove important.  Here, the legislature found, for example, “that the people of Washington 
have benefited enormously from the presence of the aerospace industry in Washington state.  
The legislature further finds that the industry continues to provide good wages and benefits 
for the thousands of engineers, mechanics, and support staff working directly in the industry 
throughout the state.” Id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See generally BARTIK, supra note 14. 
 65. Scientific research and development, software development, and financial services are 
some of the strategic industries, but so are agriculture, manufacturing, and distribution. 
Excelsior Jobs Program, N.Y. ST.:  EMPIRE ST. DEV., https://cdn.esd.ny.gov/ 
businessprograms/data/excelsior/excelsiorjobsprogramoverview.pdf [https://perma.cc/A24D-
L886] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 66. Letter from Howard Zemsky, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Empire State Dev., to 
Holly Sullivan, Head of WW Econ. Dev., Amazon.com Servs., Inc. (Nov. 12, 2018), 
https://d39w7f4ix9f5s9.cloudfront.net/4d/db/a54a9d6c4312bb171598d0b2134c/new-york-
agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRE2-2ML9]. 
 67. Two examples in New York City from 2013 involved the Hudson Yards development 
on Manhattan’s West Side and the Willets Point development in Queens. Hudson Yards, 
Willets Point Receive Tax Breaks, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:00 PM), 
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Program, for instance, includes funds for local property tax exemptions in 
addition to jobs tax credits.68  Property tax exemptions often accompany 
discretionary land use approvals, which are addressed in greater detail below.  
Of note here, none of the types of exemptions mentioned above are auctioned 
off.69  Instead, they are generally used to influence company location 
decisions.  The exemption programs are the result of specific legislation 
authorized by state or local legislatures. 
2.  Bonding:  General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and Private 
Activity Bonds 
States and cities authorize the issuance of bonds to fund development and 
support activities like private economic development.70  The Internal 
Revenue Code (the “Code”) classifies state- and local-government bonds as 
either governmental bonds or private activity bonds.71  Generally, private 
activity bonds are not tax-exempt, like governmental bonds are, unless the 
activities funded are qualified private activities.72  Today, the major qualified 
private activities funded by private activity bonds are facilities built by 
hospitals, universities, and other private corporations.73 
The subsidization of private companies includes instances where the state 
or city government builds a facility and then leases it to a private business.  
The private business pays rent, taking advantage of the lower interest rate 
that the government may obtain based on the tax-exempt nature of the bond.  
In some cases, the lease can be structured as a lease-to-own—whereby the 
company owns the property after making lease payments for a certain number 
of years.74 
 
https://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20131210/REAL_ESTATE/131219984/hudson-
yards-willets-point-receive-tax-breaks [https://perma.cc/CY33-53P6]. 
 68. See, e.g., Excelsior Jobs Program, supra note 65. 
 69. See id. at 3 (describing the application process, which does not discuss an auction 
process—rather, applicants complete funding applications that may, if approved, lead to 
certificates allowing selected applicants to claim tax credits). 
 70. Borrowing is typically subject to allowable debt limits.  For an in-depth, critical 
analysis of how states and local governments limit their borrowing, see generally Nadav 
Shoked, Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239 (2017). 
 71. See I.R.C § 103 (2012).  From a terminology perspective, “private activity bonds” 
were formerly known as “industrial development bonds”—a change that has created some 
problems. ROBERT S. AMDURSKY ET AL., MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW:  THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 498 (2d ed. 2013). 
 72. See I.R.C. § 141 (2012).  In 1968, Congress continued the exemption of interest earned 
on “industrial development bonds” but set limits on the amount and purpose. ROBERT A. 
FIPPINGER, THE SECURITIES LAW OF PUBLIC FINANCE 47 (2d ed. 1998). 
 73. Martin Z. Braun & Sahil Kapur, Congress’s Tax Bill Keeps Subsidies for Private 
Activity Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2017, 5:15 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2017-12-15/congress-s-tax-bill-keeps-subsidies-for-private-activity-bonds 
[https://perma.cc/H6UE-552V]. 
 74. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Indus. Dev. Bd. v. All Taxpayers, 938 So. 2d 11, 26 (La. 
2006). 
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While the Code sets caps on the amount of nonexempt private activity 
bonds,75 leaseback or lease-and-sale arrangements allow governments to 
avoid the strict caps.  Some argue that states and cities are smart to engage in 
creative transactions that permit support for private businesses when such 
activity would otherwise be prevented.76  Courts struggle to set the outer 
limits of industrial support by subnational government.77  While auctions are 
common tools for subnational governments to use in the disposition of 
property, they are not commonly used to influence business-location 
decisions. 
Some state finance laws limit local government from taking on debt that 
exceeds the useful life of a capital project.78  Robert S. Amdursky, Clayton 
P. Gillette, and G. Allen Bass point out that the effect of such regimes is 
twofold:  first, it allows the municipality to require future users to pay their 
share of the costs of a capital project; second, it limits the ability of a current 
generation to require a future generation to pay for a project from which it 
derives no benefit.79 
3.  Auctions and Local Land Use 
Local land use law mechanisms are additional economic development 
tools available to local governments to incentivize private economic 
development.80  Currently, market-based principles of bidding and 
auctioning exist within the realm of local land use law.  Examples of such 
market-based tools include tax increment financing districts, transferrable 
development rights, and even requests for development proposals, among 
others. 
When county or city governments issue tax-exempt development bonds to 
condemn and improve land for a new manufacturing facility or corporate 
headquarters, they need a stream of revenue to pay off the bonds.  In many 
cases, this is accomplished using the additional property tax revenue earned 
once the development sites are improved.81  Known as tax-increment 
financing, the process, which dates back to California in 1952, begins with 
the city council approving a special tax-increment district and a project 
 
 75. STEVEN MAGUIRE & JOSEPH S. HUGHES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31457, PRIVATE 
ACTIVITY BONDS:  AN INTRODUCTION 17 (2018). 
 76. See, e.g., Tom Tew, Industrial Bond Financing and the Florida Public Purpose 
Doctrine, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 171, 194 (1966). 
 77. See generally Comment, supra note 33. 
 78. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 71, at 12 (citing N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 11.00 
(McKinney 1988 Supp.)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. The focus of this background section is on state and local subsidization tools.  
Additional subsidy tools exist at the federal level.  Environmental Protection Agency waivers, 
for instance, provide additional subsidies to industry to encourage investments in new 
factories.  A recent example is the Foxconn deal in Wisconsin. See Michael Hawthorne, EPA 
Chief Pruitt Overrules Staff, Gives Wisconsin’s Walker, Foxconn Big Break on Smog, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 2, 2018, 6:49 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-
smog-pruitt-foxconn-20180501-story.html [https://perma.cc/FY59-8XJG]. 
 81. Jerry Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1087 (1996). 
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plan.82  Following the plan’s adoption, the tax base of the special district is 
frozen—any additional revenue is directed to pay off the bonds issued to fund 
the development.83 
The otherwise logical nature of tax-increment financing plans belies their 
occasional controversial nuances.  One botched tax-increment financing 
project in St. Louis, for instance, placed a plan to redevelop 1500 acres of 
urban land in limbo.  Disagreement over the project has led the city and the 
developer, as well as the Missouri Attorney General, to court.84  It is not 
unsurprising that tax-increment financing schemes can be politically 
controversial.  The political economy of urban areas is often a source of 
political contention. 
Other market-based mechanisms for auction-like bidding include 
transferable development rights and city issuances of requests for proposals.  
Transferrable development rights have been used in dense urban areas like 
New York City’s Theater District.85  Importantly, the transfer of 
development rights—the ability to take buildable air rights from one property 
and transfer them to another—has always been seen as a strictly private 
market.86  A private market for transferrable development rights is certainly 
a kindred spirit to an auction for job-creation subsidies; once a government 
creates the program, transferrable development rights are exchanged in a 
purely private market without government intervention. 
Over recent decades, cities holding large portfolios of vacant properties 
have turned to selling vacant land to mostly real estate speculators through 
auctions.87  In New York City, government officials rarely place any 
conditions on auctions, which has led landowners to leave land vacant and 
community groups to oppose the auction process.88 
Aside from auctions, cities transfer property through open requests for 
proposals (the “RFP” process).  A recent RFP for a mixed-use commercial 
real estate project in Denver describes two properties that the city purchased 
 
 82. See BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.:  HOW AMERICA 
REBUILDS CITIES 97 (1989) (discussing the history and process of tax-increment financing 
processes and planning). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See generally Smith v. City of St. Louis, 395 S.W.3d 20 (Mo. 2013); Jacob Barker, 
Paul McKee’s Northside Regeneration Accused of Tax Credit Fraud in Lawsuit by Missouri 
Attorney General, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 14, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/ 
business/local/paul-mckee-s-northside-regeneration-accused-of-tax-credit-
fraud/article_e067f2a6-18ec-5d5f-8e54-ab7a2f2cba0c.html [https://perma.cc/K5S9-S552] 
(describing attorney general’s lawsuit and its potential to terminate the financing agreement). 
 85. Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City:  TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Well-
Considered Plan, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 867, 900 (1984) (discussing the designation of a special 
Theater District that both preserved the unique neighborhood flavor and provided developers 
with general growth incentives). 
 86. Id. at 903. 
 87. See, e.g., TOM ANGOTTI, NEW YORK FOR SALE:  COMMUNITY PLANNING CONFRONTS 
GLOBAL REAL ESTATE 100 (2008) (discussing the way New York City began disposing of its 
accumulated vacant properties). 
 88. Id. (“In the throes of the abandonment crisis, communities mobilized to stop the city 
auctions.”). 
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for affordable housing, among other uses.89  The RFP process allows 
governments to solicit interest from developers to construct a particular 
project.90  The RFP process is a way for government to access the market 
when it seeks services at a fair price.91  Also, the RFP process is a way for 
government to regulate private market activity—in this example, commercial 
real estate development—in a way that is consistent with public law norms.92 
B.  Competitiveness:  State and Local Government Arguments for Economic 
Development Activities 
In the last thirty years, state and local government incentive spending has 
spiked.93  A number of states stand out.  New York leads at over $13 billion.94  
Close behind are Washington State at just under $12 billion, Michigan at just 
under $11 billion, and Louisiana at just under $10 billion.95 
It is commonplace for businesses to pit states and cities against each other 
when choosing where to locate a new factory or headquarters.96  In addition, 
to retain existing businesses, governors and local executive officials routinely 
argue that subsidies are needed to keep businesses in a given locale.97  These 
subsidies are largely a response to threats from private companies to move 
their operations elsewhere.98  Thus, the reasoning goes, jurisdictions need to 
offer subsidies to remain competitive.99 
 
 89. DENVER OFFICE OF ECON. DEV., 2018 REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS (RFP) 1 (2018), 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/RealEstate/rfp/8
315/East%20Colfax%20RFP_Final_8315.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JKX-MJ7B]. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (proposing that affordable housing be constructed).  Fundamentally, land use 
controls differ from direct economic development support.  State or local governments 
exclusively provide land-use controls.  Land is unique.  Economic development loans, grants, 
or other incentives are financial in nature.  Developers can choose to take or leave them. See 
Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements:  A New Local Government Tool or Another 
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 34 (2010) (noting that when local 
governments elect to subsidize a project, any developer who opposes the local government’s 
restrictions can simply decline to be involved). 
 93. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 1 (“Business incentives have more than tripled since 
1990.”). 
 94. See MATTERA ET AL., supra note 1 (estimating the total spending in New York State 
to be $13,344,524,119 across 33 projects receiving at least $50 million in subsidies). 
 95. Id. (estimating the total spending for Washington State to be $11,944,000,000 across 
just two projects, for Michigan to be $10,891,136,000 over 35 projects, and for Louisiana to 
be $9,716,976,012 over 26 projects). 
 96. See Amazon News, supra note 19 (describing the 238 cities that pitched Amazon 
incentives to locate new headquarters); Tesla, Nevada Agree on Finalized Incentive 
Agreement, L.V. SUN (Aug. 3, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/aug/03/tesla-
nevada-agree-finalized-incentive-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/2928-7YLK]. 
 97. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019); 
supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing two such funds in each state respectively). 
 98. In the Florida and Texas examples, the governors are authorized to use legislative 
funds only when a company is considering another state in addition to either Florida or Texas. 
See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019). 
 99. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018) (“The Legislature therefore declares that sufficient 
resources shall be available to respond to extraordinary economic opportunities and to 
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Some businesses will pursue subsidies for expansion projects and argue 
that subsidies are needed to prevent competition from another state.100  In the 
case of the aerospace subsidy in Washington State, Boeing threatened 
relocation to another state to, among other sweeteners, extract union 
concessions.101  In another instance, Intel, one of the largest employers in 
New Mexico, invested $26 billion in local expansion—financed through the 
issuance of industrial development bonds.102  In contrast to the Boeing 
incentive package, Intel’s arrangement with New Mexico merits additional 
study.  First, Intel is required to disclose how it is meeting the job targets 
required in the bond issuance.103  Second, there are clawback provisions that 
apply if Intel fails to meet its obligations under the bond issuance 
agreement.104  This reporting requirement and clawback mechanism are 
unique among projects of a similar subsidy size.105 
A number of states, including Texas and Florida, empower their governors 
to quickly close deals with businesses promising to engage in commercial 
real estate development in their state.  Texas’s governor can access a fund to 
close deals with companies that threaten to move to another state because of 
competition.106  The legislature created and funded the Texas Enterprise 
Fund in 2003.107  Through the end of September 2018, the Texas Enterprise 
Fund offered over $609 million—and disbursed over $503 million—in 
support of a claimed 93,806 direct jobs.108  Of the amount disbursed, over 
$48 million was repaid and almost $28 million was recovered through a 
liquidated damages repayment—a clawback.109 
Florida has adopted a similar approach to Texas.  The Florida legislature 
ratified a Quick Action Closing Fund to give the governor’s office the 
resources to rapidly close deals.110  This fund has proven controversial and 
 
compete effectively for these high-impact business facilities, critical private infrastructure in 
rural areas, and key businesses in economically distressed urban or rural communities . . . .”). 
 100. This was certainly the case with the Boeing example. See General Information:  
Employment Data, supra note 3. 
 101. See Scott, supra note 3. 
 102. Rachel Sams, Intel Rio Rancho Capital Spending Rises as Jobs Decline Appears to 
Slow, ALBUQUERQUE BUS. FIRST (Apr. 17, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/ 
albuquerque/news/2018/04/17/intel-rio-rancho-capital-spending-rises-as-jobs.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9A4-L2GU] (describing Intel’s reporting and compliance with terms 
agreed to with New Mexico in exchange for jobs subsidies). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The author reviewed the fifty most expensive subsidies in the Good Jobs First database 
and found that New Mexico was an early adopter of the clawback requirement. See MATTERA 
ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. 
 106. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078(k) (West 2019); see also Texas Enterprise 
Fund, TEX. ECON. DEV., https://gov.texas.gov/business/page/texas-enterprise-fund [https:// 
perma.cc/YZ23-CCVH] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 107. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.078 (West 2019). 
 108. Texas Enterprise Fund (TEF) as of September 30, 2018, TEX. ECON. DEV., 
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/business/TEF_Listing_10-11-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8BWY-E292] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See FLA. STAT. § 288.1088 (2018). 
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several prominent Republican state legislators zeroed it out in recent budget 
negotiations, calling it “corporate welfare.”111  Governor Rick Scott, in 
seeking $85 million for the fund from the legislature, said, “Florida has to 
compete with 49 other states and global markets across the world for jobs 
and I will fight to make sure we have every available tool to remain 
competitive.”112  Arguments for the need to subsidize businesses based on 
competition grounds have a similar, if not stale, odor. 
Public outrage about government subsidies for private companies 
generally falls into one of three categories.  One category of outrage stems 
from companies taking incentives and then cutting jobs and closing plants 
anyway.113  This category of outrage is illustrated by workers in the Midwest 
who are disillusioned by competition from overseas manufacturing.114  Many 
of them responded to the economic nationalism message of the 2016 Trump 
campaign.115 
A second category is outrage about subsidies attracting new companies 
from outside a jurisdiction.  A third category is general outrage at the idea of 
the government propping up private companies at all.  Outrage in this broad 
category comes from liberals who would prefer government to invest in 
public infrastructure projects, education, health care, and more.116  In 
addition, outrage in this category comes from conservatives who would 
prefer government to cut taxes and reduce its size and influence over private 
 
 111. Matt Dixon, Scott’s Divisive Incentive Fund Attracts Big Deals, and Its Share of 
Critics, POLITICO (Jan. 6, 2017, 5:31 AM), https://www.politico.com/states/florida/ 
story/2017/01/scotts-divisive-incentive-fund-attracts-big-deals-and-its-share-of-critics-
108509 [https://perma.cc/R9HS-U6NF]. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Autoworker outrage in Michigan and other Midwest states is illustrative.  The 
Michigan legislature, for example, has acted to keep and grow jobs in the auto industry and 
other fields.  In particular, Michigan’s legislature passed the Michigan Economic Growth 
Authority Act in 1995 to provide job creation tax incentives to businesses. See MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 207.801 (1995).  Some of the incentives proved too favorable to automakers, like 
General Motors, which agreed to limit its most recent round of incentives from 2009, but per 
agreement with the state, failed to disclose the total amount of the incentives. See Livengood 
et al., supra note 22. 
 114. See Scott Horsley, Trump Administration Threatens to Withhold Subsidies from GM, 
NPR (Nov. 27, 2018, 3:26 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/27/671231681/trump-
administration-threatens-to-withhold-subsidies-from-gm [https://perma.cc/F4TH-6V89]. 
 115. President Trump’s 2016 victory in Pennsylvania can be attributed in part to his margin 
of victory in Luzerne County, a county that twice went for Obama.  In 2016, 60 percent of 
Trump’s 44,000 vote win in Pennsylvania came from Luzerne County (26,000 votes).  At the 
same time, manufacturing jobs in Luzerne County have declined from 42,000 in 1980 to 
19,000 now. Shannon M. Monnat & David L. Brown, More Than A Rural Revolt:  Landscapes 
of Despair and the 2016 Presidential Election, 55 J. RURAL STUD. 227, 236 (2017). 
 116. See, e.g., Editorial, Amazon News Shows How Corporate Incentive Arms Race Is Bad 
for Delaware: Editorial, DEL. ONLINE (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:43 PM), https:// 
www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/editorials/2018/11/14/amazon-news-shows-
problem-incentive-arms-race-editorial/1999842002/ [https://perma.cc/Y7DS-BUJZ] (arguing 
that states should compete for jobs by investing in infrastructure, education, and job training); 
see also Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (@AOC), TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2018, 11:40 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Ocasio2018/status/1062203458227503104 [https://perma.cc/6WS2-
U9EW] (“We’ve been getting calls and outreach from Queens residents all day about this.  
The community’s response?  Outrage.”). 
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citizens and the economy.117  Criticism of the recent Amazon HQ2 and HQ3 
selection processes illustrates both the second and third types of outrage from 
both ends of the political spectrum.118  Unsurprisingly, Amazon is steeling 
itself against popular outrage by engaging local lobbyists to protect its 
promised incentives.119 
None of the examples or programs mentioned in this section made use of 
auctions to distribute incentives.  The named categories of outrage will be 
revisited in the context of potential solutions.  For now, the focus of the 
discussion shifts to the potential negative impacts of private economic 
development activity on state and local budgets. 
C.  Fiscal Risks to State and Local Governments Due to Economic 
Development Activities 
A challenge to analyzing the effectiveness of a given program is lack of 
information.  A number of state economic development programs, often led 
by independent economic development agencies authorized to cut deals, 
involve a very low degree of transparency.120  In some instances, economic 
development programs have caused state revenue crises as the programs were 
implemented.  The Empire Zone program,121 which lapsed in 2010 in New 
York State, failed to restart economic activity in rust-belt cities like Buffalo, 
Rochester, and Syracuse.122  But there were bright spots in the Empire Zone 
program, such as a new microchip manufacturing plant in the Saratoga 
Springs area opened by worldwide semiconductor company Global 
Foundries.123 
Yet, data on the Empire Zone program is difficult to obtain.124  Local 
governments were given autonomy to draw boundaries of specific zones.125  
New York was not unique in making these types of missteps.  However, the 
 
 117. See Editorial, supra note 8. 
 118. See Veronique De Rugy, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Is Right About Amazon’s 
Corporate Welfare, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 13, 2018, 2:36 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/ 
corner/rep-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-is-right-about-amazons-corporate-welfare/ 
[https://perma.cc/K4VC-ZPBC]. 
 119. See Ankita Rao, Amazon Is Bringing in Elite Lobbyists Amid Seething Rage Over 
HQ2, VICE (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/nepq7q/amazon-is-
bringing-in-elite-lobbyists-amid-seething-rage-over-hq2 [https://perma.cc/K5Z8-9GPF]. 
 120. See, e.g., Michigan Economic Growth Authority Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.801 
(2019); S. 1-B, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (enacted).  
 121. See N.Y. S. 1-B. 
 122. See Knauss, supra note 23.  Notably, the Empire Zone program allowed businesses to 
take credits over fourteen years, allowed for refundability of those tax credits, and permitted 
(early on) “shirt changing” where a company could double dip on the credits by changing its 
corporate names. Id.  The program also supported retail, an industry that experts argue should 
not be subsidized. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 13, 50.  Law firms took advantage too. See 
Knauss, supra note 23. 
 123. This plant brought 3000 jobs to New York State’s Capital Region at a subsidy of 
around $1 billion, around half of which came through Empire Zone tax credits. See Knauss, 
supra note 23. 
 124. One journalist in Syracuse obtained information following a Freedom of Information 
Law request. Id. 
 125. Id. (discussing how hydro companies paid local governments to draw boundaries). 
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Empire Zone program brought New York to the top of the standings in terms 
of state spending on private economic development activity.126 
In one particularly egregious example, a developer in Syracuse, New York 
engaged in planning that was “dominated by brainstorming ways to use 
taxpayers’ money” to expand Destiny USA—a shopping mall.127  The 
developer “worked with a philosophy that nothing could get in the project’s 
way—not laws, financial hurdles or the practical difficulty of building 
something so big.”128  Support from local government was all but assured.  
As a result, the group “never worried about opposition from City Hall . . . 
[because] the city [w]as desperate for development.”129 
The most fanciful plans for the Destiny USA project ultimately did not 
come to fruition.130  The scope of the project was impractical and otherwise 
seemingly aimless, other than the fact that it was designed to soak up tax 
incentives.131  After building a vastly scaled-down version of what was 
originally planned, Pyramid, the developer, announced that it would not 
move forward with the remaining planned development.132  Yet, the local tax 
base has not grown since the company still retains decades of local property 
tax exemptions.133 
The Destiny USA example teaches three lessons.  First, developers 
frequently view themselves as having leverage over city officials because the 
declining Rust Belt needs economic development to grow tax revenue.  
Second, focusing on low-wage sectors, like retail, typically will not be 
fruitful compared to high-skilled, high-paying sectors of the economy like 
high-tech services and manufacturing.  Third, the law should scrutinize 
efforts to subsidize private economic development activity undertaken 
without meaningful review, oversight, transparency, or accountability.134 
The Michigan Economic Growth Act, which was implemented by the 
Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC), is also noteworthy 
for its lack of transparency and fiscal precariousness.135  The act created the 
Michigan Economic Growth Authority (MEGA), which oversaw a tax credit 
program intended to prop up the declining auto manufacturing sector during 
the Great Recession.136  In a moment of questionable legislation, the program 
 
 126. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 68. 
 127. See John O’Brien, Inside Planning Destiny USA:  It Was All About the “Golden Cow” 
of Tax Breaks, SYRACUSE.COM (July 1, 2012), https://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/ 
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 128. Id. 
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 130. Rick Moriarty & Tim Knauss, Destiny USA’s Untaxed Anti-climax:  After 13 Years, 
It Is What It Is, SYRACUSE.COM (June 7, 2012), https://www.syracuse.com/news/ 
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 131. See O’Brien, supra note 127. 
 132. See Moriarty & Knauss, supra note 130. 
 133. Id. 
 134. For a discussion of “opportunity zones,” see infra Part IV.D. 
 135. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.801 (2019). 
 136. See id.; Chad Livengood, Michigan Pays Price for Auto Investment, DET. NEWS (Feb. 
5, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2015/02/05/michigan-tax-
credits-car-companies/22908711/ [https://perma.cc/3NRP-32XA]. 
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issued unlimited tax incentives to the largest auto manufacturers.137  In one 
instance, General Motors (GM) only agreed to cap the amount of tax credits 
it received following a massive impending fiscal crisis.138  In exchange for 
not having to disclose the value of the tax credits, GM finally agreed to a 
cap.139  Eventually, in July 2014, Michigan reported that GM’s tax credits 
exceeded $2.1 billion.140  Ford agreed to cap its tax credits at $2.3 billion, 
and Fiat Chrysler agreed to a $1.7 billion cap.141 
Since both the Empire Zone and MEGA programs have ended, it is 
difficult to obtain data about the programs.  Focus on newer replacement 
programs also further obscures the prior programs.  This is unfortunate since 
the original programs themselves were no help to state fiscal budgets.  State 
governments have had difficulty being successful in this area.  In most cases, 
government fails because it is trying to do more than private companies:  it 
seeks to either extend a mature and declining industry or actively launch a 
new technology sector.142 
II.  DOCTRINAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS HAVE FAILED TO 
CONSTRAIN JOB-BUYING LAWMAKING 
Legal and judicial efforts have failed to check wealth redistribution to 
private companies.  Historically, the shift to industrialization and new 
developments in technology have led state governments to encourage private 
enterprise.143  In the mid-1800s, new infrastructure projects, such as canals, 
bridges, and railroads, brought about direct government support for 
companies.144  When particular enterprises failed—canal corporations went 
bankrupt or railroad companies collapsed—the public scrutinized 
government support for private industries.145  Significantly, the years 
 
 137. See Jarrett Skorup, MEGA Failure:  Job Projections from Michigan Tax Credit 
Program Rarely Came True, MICH. CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (May 15, 2014), 
https://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/MEGA-program-a-complete-failure [https:// 
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was eliminated”). 
 138. See Livengood et al., supra note 22. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Livengood, supra note 136 (“Michigan faces years of budget uncertainty because 
state leaders awarded billions of dollars in tax credits mostly to Detroit’s three automakers to 
save tens of thousands of manufacturing jobs during the Great Recession . . . .  General Motors 
has been awarded more than $2.1 billion in refundable tax credits by the Granholm and Snyder 
administrations—the most of any automaker.”). 
 141. Id. 
 142. MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:  DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. 
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 18 (2015). 
 143. Ellis Leigh Waldron, The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation 34 (1952) 
(unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Washington) (on file with author) (“The tremendous 
capital demands of canal, road and railroad development were at that time beyond the reach 
and inclination of private capital reserves.  So the state governments assumed the burden.”). 
 144. Id. at 34–35 (noting that in New York, income from fees to use the Erie Canal offset 
the need for the state to levy taxes to pay for the cost of the canal’s construction). 
 145. Several factors led to the change in public attitude against government assisting 
private businesses:  (1) high rates of default, (2) a belief that private companies did not need 
public support, (3) skepticism about government favoring some companies over others, (4) 
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between the financial crises of 1837 and 1857 were some of the most frenzied 
in the area of developing the “internal arteries of commerce.”146  Much of 
the investment dollars that fueled the construction binge of the time came 
from foreign European shores.147 
At the same time, cities and towns were, and continue to be, dependent on 
private economic development activity.148  Thus, planning, designing, 
constructing, and maintaining infrastructure to support private enterprise is 
closely aligned with the goals of local elected officials and administrative 
agency staff.149  The importance of attracting and retaining private businesses 
is central to the existence of state and local administrative agencies.150 
Yet, information about state and local incentives to private businesses is 
very limited.151  Further, studies suggest that no state tests whether the 
legislative efforts to create jobs through incentives are working.152  As a 
result, it is unclear whether economic growth actually results from economic 
development activity by government.153  Nevertheless, lawmakers continue 
to dole out incentives to private companies.154  Two primary legal 
constraints, one doctrinal and one constitutional, have developed to limit 
government support for economic development activities. 
The public purpose doctrine emerged in response to a number of concerns 
about wasteful government spending.  Each of the fifty states has codified 
the public purpose doctrine by placing limits on direct gifts, loans, or the 
 
fear of corruption, (5) fear of government’s intervention in free markets, and (6) government 
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 148. Mulligan, supra note 16, at 2023 (describing local government incentive payments to 
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 151. See BARTIK, supra note 14, at 11718. 
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 153. Richard Schragger makes this point over the course of his recent book, City Power.  
Schragger argues that we ought to be skeptical generally about subnational governments 
making industrial policy. See generally SCHRAGGER, supra note 27. 
 154. See Story et al., supra note 11. 
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extension of government credit for private interests.155  Additionally, state 
constitutional amendments followed the development of the public purpose 
doctrine. 
Yet, courts are unwilling to constrain state and local spending on private 
businesses.  The public purpose doctrine is ineffective as a limit on legislative 
action.156  Courts broadly interpret the public purposes of economic 
development activities to fall within allowable limits.157  Also, courts read a 
public purpose exception into constitutional limits on government spending 
for private enterprise.158 
A.  Courts Defer to Legislatures in Broadly Interpreting the Public 
Purposes of Economic Development Activities 
Generally, the government may not use public funds for the benefit of 
private interests.159  There must be a public purpose when government 
allocates public resources.  The definition of a public purpose, however, is 
not well-settled in the law.160  Courts apply a broad standard:  the legislature 
has broad discretion to determine whether an action constitutes a public 
purpose.161  Courts should only restrain “clearly evasive” legislative 
actions.162 
As early as the mid-1800s, courts addressed matters involving the 
authority of cities to levy taxes to pay for state-supported infrastructure 
projects.  One case in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, Goddin v. 
Crump,163 involved a tax levied by the city of Richmond to fund the purchase 
of shares in a state-chartered corporation whose purpose was to connect 
Richmond to the Ohio River via canal.164  The court in Goddin held that the 
 
 155. Rubin, supra note 36, at 1313 n.15 (“All fifty states either have amended their 
constitutions to include the [public purpose] doctrine or the doctrine has received judicial 
sanction.”). 
 156. Briffault, supra note 31, at 945. 
 157. Robert S. Amdursky, The Urban Crisis, Private Enterprise, and State Constitutions:  
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 159. See State ex rel. Ohio Cty. Comm’n v. Samol, 275 S.E.2d 2, 9 (W. Va. 1980) (Neely, 
C.J., concurring); Waldron, supra note 143, at 1 (“Midway through the nineteenth century, 
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 161. Associated Gen. Contractors of S.D., Inc. v. Schreiner, 492 N.W.2d 916, 923 (S.D. 
1992) (“Determining whether a statutory purpose is public or private is pretty much a matter 
of policy and wisdom for the legislature.  In making such a decision it is vested with a large 
discretion with which courts should not interfere unless its action is clearly evasive.” (quoting 
Clem v. City of Yankton, 160 N.W.2d 125, 131 (S.D. 1968))). 
 162. Id. 
 163. 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120 (1837). 
 164. Id. at 133–36. 
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local ordinance authorizing the city tax collector to seize the property of 
residents who refused to pay the tax was valid.165 
A number of other early cases addressed governmental power to delegate 
the authority to levy taxes for public purposes.  Sharpless v. Mayor of 
Philadelphia166 involved the subscription of railway stock.167  While the 
court in Sharpless upheld the legislation authorizing the purchase of railroad 
company shares, Chief Justice Jeremiah S. Black found that if the facts 
involved a taking of private property for private use, then such a taking would 
be unconstitutional.168 
The first appearance of the public purpose doctrine in the U.S. Supreme 
Court was in Loan Ass’n v. Topeka169 in 1874.170  In that case, the local 
government used tax revenue to pay interest on bonds sold to support the 
development of an ironworks manufacturing company.171  The intent was to 
increase bridge construction.172  A financial company that had bought the 
bonds sued when the city failed to make interest payments.173  The Court 
held the bond issuance impermissible because the city had not established a 
public purpose in extending the city’s credit.174  The Court’s opinion did 
suggest that expenditures not reliant on levying a tax might be permissible.175  
This distinction places in contrast project revenue bonds, funded through 
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 166. 21 Pa. 147 (1853). 
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 168. See id. at 167; Waldron, supra note 143, at 90 (“While it would be ‘palpably 
unconstitutional’ to take private property for private use, [Justice] Black could discover ‘no 
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 169. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874). 
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payable to the King Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing and Iron-Works Company, of 
Topeka, to aid and encourage that company in establishing and operating bridge shops . . . .”). 
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a manufactory of iron bridges in that city”). 
 173. Id. at 656–57 (describing the tax assessed to pay the bonds and the action brought for 
payment on the bonds). 
 174. Id. at 664. 
 175. Id. at 659 (“If these municipal corporations . . . have a fund or other property out of 
which they can pay the debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within 
the power of the legislature of the State to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly 
private . . . .”). 
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project fees, and general obligation bonds, which states may pay for using 
tax revenue.176 
State courts, where most litigation related to the public purpose doctrine 
originates, quickly applied Loan Ass’n’s limits on taxation for private 
purposes.177  However, the public purpose doctrine was never a total 
limitation on legislative actions.178  Nevertheless, state and local 
governments largely avoided the limits set by Loan Ass’n with non-tax, 
alternative financing arrangements.179  Further, on principle, courts are 
increasingly restrained in their efforts to invalidate programs approved by 
legislatures. 
Judicial restraint has led to mixed results and no clear rules.  Cases 
involving taxation for the purposes of marketing or promoting agricultural 
products, for example, are often decided based on how economically 
important judges determine a particular product to be.  Maine’s highest court 
was willing to uphold a potato tax to support farming because potato 
production is significant to the state’s economy.180  But a similar tax on 
apples in West Virginia was rejected since apple production is only an 
incidental part of that state’s economy.181 
State court decisions largely rest on legislative findings associated with the 
given subsidy program.182  In State ex rel. Ohio County Commission v. 
Samol,183 a 1980 case before the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 
for instance, the court relied on legislative findings to uphold a state law 
authorizing counties and cities to issue bonds for commercial real estate 
projects.184  General legislative findings supporting the spending of public 
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 183. 275 S.E.2d 2 (W. Va. 1980). 
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funds for a private purpose seem sufficient for courts to avoid invaliding a 
state law.185 
Analysis of twenty years of case law reveals that state courts are unlikely 
to find government programs illegal based on the public purpose doctrine.186  
The scholarly discussion about the public purpose doctrine has focused on its 
toothlessness.187  However, the common law alone was not the only legal 
tool used to reign in government spending on economic development 
activity. 
State constitutional amendments followed the development of the public 
purpose doctrine.  Many states in the first half of the 1880s adopted 
constitutional prohibitions on state support for private companies.  In certain 
instances, state constitutional amendments were designed to limit local 
government support for railroads.188 
Scholars argue that such provisions prevent states and cities from engaging 
in much of the economic development activity that takes place today.189  
Federal courts are reluctant to overturn the decisions of state courts that are 
political in nature once state court judges have sanctioned state and local 
legislative activities.190 
In the background is the broadening of the meaning of public purpose, 
which was discussed in Kelo v. City of New London.191  Although the 
backlash to the Kelo decision led to state constitutional amendments limiting 
the ability of states to condemn property through eminent domain,192 the 
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often weak enforcement of existing state constitutional prohibitions in 
support for private companies is perhaps instructive.193 
The push and pull of constitutional limitation versus deregulation is 
significant.  Proponents of constitutional interpretation through a 
deregulatory lens view competition among neighboring states as a guiding 
principle.  If, for instance, a number of Southern states permitted local 
governments to support private manufacturing through the construction of a 
new plant, then why should Florida not permit it as well?194 
Judicial interpretation of constitutional limits on subsidies for private 
industry can be separated from the interpretation of whether there is a public 
purpose.195  Step one is to establish a public purpose.  Assuming a court can 
find a public purpose, step two is to evaluate whether the particular bond 
issue (in the case of industrial development bonds) constitutes the city 
pledging its credit.  If the city is not pledging its credit, for instance in the 
case of a bond that is a private activity bond as opposed to a general 
obligation bond, then the activity should not be prohibited by the 
constitution.196 
B.  Existing Proposals for Substantive and Procedural Constraints 
Scholars have not fully addressed the government’s substantive and 
procedural challenges in constraining economic development activity.  
Substantively, the public purpose doctrine fails because of judicial inability 
to craft doctrinal constraints that limit state and local spending.197  
Specifically, the doctrine lacks a clear substantive definition of a public 
purpose.  Much of the public purpose litigation relates to the government’s 
ability to levy taxes to support particular economic activities.198  Public 
purpose litigation illustrates the challenges courts have faced in crafting clear 
doctrinal constraints. 
It might seem attractive to entirely outlaw state and local government 
spending outside of public infrastructure improvement.  This is the purest 
and simplest limit.  However, it is unlikely that courts would exert such 
constraints on their own without some galvanizing facts.  The political 
pressure to redistribute wealth in order to claim credit for attracting and 
retaining employers is very powerful.199  As a result, such a total ban seems 
unlikely in the near term. 
Another proposal focuses on analyzing state and local agency 
professionals under agency law rather than contract law.200  This forces 
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courts to apply an agency standard—which looks at whether the agent acted 
in the public’s interest—instead of a contractual one.201  Applying an agency 
law approach offers a wealth of case law and analysis for courts to draw on 
in interpreting job-buying cases.202  Another proposal argues for the 
increased role of the attorney general in constraining spending by the 
legislature.203 
Another argument proposes that Congress should ban state and local 
incentives to businesses and should impose federal tax on such incentives to 
discourage them.204  This proposal, articulated by Arthur Rolnick, is a “stick” 
approach to limiting spending.205  Other tax regimes, like the federal, state, 
and local tools available to preserve affordable housing created through the 
LIHTC, offer carrots as well.206  Rolnick’s suggestion to tax private 
companies for public incentives bears merit.  Crafting appropriate language 
to capture potentially harmful spending would require much care. 
Reforms at the federal level seem necessary given the pervasive nature of 
state and local spending on private businesses.  Any reform effort that does 
not include federal action is liable to face piecemeal implementation.  In Part 
IV, this Article will revisit federal reforms and detail the next steps in 
regulating job-buying. 
Fundamentally, any reform needs to involve cooperation among state and 
local lawmakers.  On the cooperation theme, David Reiss has suggested that 
cities sharing similar population sizes should cooperate in agreeing not to 
compete with one another for particular companies.207  This proposal is an 
innovative twist on efforts to stop incentive border wars across state lines. 
Kansas City is a well-known hot spot in this war.208  Recently, Missouri 
adopted legislation that would prevent the issuance of tax incentives to lure 
companies from adjoining counties in Kansas.209  On August 13, 2019, 
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Missouri Governor Mike Parson and Kansas Governor Laura Kelly signed 
an agreement to end the use of tax incentives to attract companies across state 
boundaries.210 
Cooperation agreements to limit business incentives might follow the lead 
of compacts or other collective agreements.211  For example, states and cities 
could agree to refrain from issuing business location incentives if a certain 
threshold of states, cities, or populations opt in. 
In 2016, the Louisiana Governor John Bel Edwards shifted veto power 
over industrial tax exemptions from the state to localities.212  Once the East 
Baton Parish School exercised its newfound power to veto an ExxonMobil 
project, however, state legislators introduced five bills to strip the local veto 
right in favor of a state appointed commission.213  This battle illustrates the 
tensions present between states and cities in legislating local conduct. 
Others have argued for the European Union model that treats business 
subsidies as export subsidies, which, if beyond a certain size, are deemed 
illegal.214  The European Union can force the company to repay subsidies if 
they exceed the allotted amount.215 
In addition to the specific targets articulated above, there are guiding 
principles that state and local elected officials should consider when 
incentivizing private business.  These include: clawbacks (recapturing 
incentives if businesses fail to fulfill the incentives’ requirements); disclosure 
(outlining what information businesses are required to submit to both justify 
the subsidy and to support the transfer of the subsidy in practice); and 
transparency (ensuring that the information disclosed is shared broadly with 
the public). 
One can imagine an economic impact statement being required, much the 
way an environmental impact statement (EIS) is required for certain types of 
developments.  Typically, an EIS is required when commercial developers 
seek land use approval or other approval to build from the government.  
Governments issue handbooks on when EISs are necessary and how to draft 
them if they are.216 
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Recently, cities and counties have required community impact reports 
before proposed development projects are approved.217  Typical community 
impact report ordinances are triggered by developments above a certain 
square footage threshold.218  Community impact reports require a developer 
to disclose financial information related to the development.219  Typical 
requirements include the financial effect of the development on the city’s 
potential revenue, the number of jobs created by the project, and its impact 
on affordable housing.220 
Market-based critics of a community economic impact statement will 
likely be wary of additional regulation of development.  They also will point 
out that such regulation will simply drive development across a local border 
to a neighboring town.  These are valid criticisms.  Therefore, such regulation 
would be more effective if imposed on a county- or state-wide basis.  That 
would require all developers in a county or state to follow the same rules. 
On the disclosure front, a community economic impact statement would 
focus attention on the specific information that would (1) justify the public 
investment and (2) ensure that the public was protected through updates. 
From a transparency perspective, there is a lack of public information 
about private economic development activity supported by state and local 
governments.  Timothy J. Bartik and others have called for additional 
research and study of the available data.221  Some datasets, like the Good 
Jobs First “megadeals” dataset222 and a similar one focused on New York,223 
are recent attempts to aggregate and report the amount and breadth of these 
subsidies.  In the rush to keep states and cities competitive, government 
programs may obfuscate the subsidy process.224  Efforts need to be taken to 
include transparency in all efforts to support private economic development 
activity. 
Dale F. Rubin has argued that the solution is to have a nonprofit 
organization dole out economic development subsidies.225  Since nonprofits 
are mission-based organizations, they are more likely to guarantee a public 
purpose.226  The trouble with this proposal is that it has been used in some 
cases and the nonprofit model has not changed how states and cities subsidize 
private actors.  The MEDC, for instance, is a Michigan nonprofit that has 
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authority from the state legislature to subsidize private businesses.227  The 
MEDC’s nonprofit status has not stopped the state from incentivizing private 
businesses at its fiscal peril.228 
This Article rejects the notion that substantive judicial interpretation of 
public purpose can constrain state and city legislatures.  The doctrinal and 
constitutional inquiries are simply too muddled.  Further, such substantive 
decisions should not necessarily be left to the courts.  Legislators, as 
representatives accountable to the people, ought to have some flexibility to 
determine what is in the interest of the public.  However, that flexibility is 
not absolute.  It should not devolve into folly.  State courts, in particular, 
ought to play a role in reviewing failed efforts to grow and maintain jobs, 
such as in the case of the Washington State tax incentive program for the 
aerospace industry, as well as others. 
III.  A TWO-STEP REVERSE AUCTION AND CLAWBACK PROPOSAL 
If lawmakers are buying jobs, then they should follow certain norms in 
government purchasing.  This Part draws from this scholarly conversation 
about government contracting to explore how government can distribute 
economic development subsidies more fairly.  It presents a novel two-step 
reverse auction and clawback solution for economic development activity 
procurement that builds on public law principles like transparency, openness, 
and accountability. 
This Part draws on existing legal academic literature on government 
contracting.  Specifically, it places economic development activity squarely 
within government contracting practices.  Economic development activity 
contracting is a more troublesome type of contracting because it requires the 
government to seek private actors to do something for third parties—in this 
case, hire them. 
A.  Two-Step Proposal to Ensure Fair Distribution of Public Funds 
1.  Where Does the Money Come From?:  Revenue vs. General Obligation 
Today, most economic development activity occurs through government-
issued revenue bonds as opposed to general obligation bonds.229  Interest and 
principal payments on revenue bonds are paid through a stream of revenue, 
like lease payments, fees, hotel taxes, or similar items.  A private entity, 
rather than the state or locality, is the obligor of the debt. 
The federal government supports revenue bonds in a number of ways.  
Notably, the interest on revenue bonds is tax-exempt.  Thus, when a state or 
local government sells revenue bonds on the financial markets, the 
government passes the tax exemption through to the debt holder, such as the 
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company or developer receiving the proceeds of the bond, and ultimately to 
investors. 
Congress limits how much tax-exempt debt can be issued for private 
activities as well as the types of projects that can access exempt debt.230  
Certain types of projects have no limit to the amount of debt that can be 
issued.  These types include airports, docks and wharves, government-owned 
solid waste disposal facilities, and qualified veterans’ mortgages.231  On the 
other hand, debt issued for qualified tax-exempt organizations, such as 
hospitals, is capped.232  In fact, over 65 percent of private activity bonds in 
2015 went to constructing hospital facilities and other properties owned by 
tax-exempt entities—this amounted to over $67 billion.233 
It is also important to know that for capped projects, states were limited in 
2018 to $37.5 billion in debt.234  For large states like California, Texas, 
Florida, and New York, this worked out to $4.2 billion, $3 billion, $2.2 
billion, and $2.1 billion respectively.235 
Here, a state or local legislature could budget a particular amount of private 
activity bond proceeds for capped and uncapped activities for private 
economic development.  Legislatures could publish a budgeted amount of 
funds to inform companies that they can bid to access them. 
2.  Step One:  The Reverse Auction 
Instead of assuming that business location incentives are legitimate, we 
ought to first question why and under what circumstances such incentives 
ought to be extended to private companies.  Economists might argue that 
such incentives should be extended only during periods of economic 
downturn, and they should be broadly available to private companies rather 
than tailored to particular industries.  Moreover, given the Amazon example, 
there are frequent auctions from competing jurisdictions to lure the same 
companies. 
In spite of fiscal crises,236 some academic economic research indicates that 
location-based incentives are useful to attract businesses.237  However, the 
cost of attracting news businesses or jobs can be great.  One study estimated 
the cost of attracting a new business to a federal “empowerment zone” at 
around $19 million per business.238  While state and local lawmakers may 
want to create new businesses, they should want to do so in the least costly 
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way possible.  To do this, officials must focus on auction design, monitoring, 
and review. 
Already, the government uses auctions to sell goods and services that it 
otherwise would need to set a price for.239  Auctioning is frequently used in 
the private sector too.  For example, online advertising providers host 
auctions to determine what ads will appear to a given user.240  The reverse 
auction, conceptually, is closely aligned with the notion of an auction.  
Instead of the award going to the highest bidder, in a reverse auction, it goes 
to the lowest. 
Readers who have recently flown on a commercial airline will likely be 
familiar with the reverse auction process.  On flights with oversold seats, 
airlines will ask passengers, frequently at a check-in kiosk or via an app, to 
bid on a voucher for future air travel.  In November 2017, United Airlines 
announced that customers could select a compensation bid amount and be 
placed on a list of potential volunteers willing to give up their seats.  The 
airline advised customers that, if needed, it would select volunteers to be 
compensated starting with the lowest bidding customers.241  The advisory 
highlighted ways that customers can bid for compensation to fly at a later 
date.242 
The academic literature on reverse auctions focuses largely, and 
unsurprisingly, on procurement and marketing.243  Sandy D. Jap concentrates 
on the importance of maintaining relationships in online reverse auctions in 
the procurement context.244  From an efficiency perspective, Jap discusses 
the ability of an online reverse auction to reduce weeks of bidding and 
document processing to a process that can occur in the span of hours.245 
A reverse auction is a mechanism for arriving at the lowest price buyers 
are willing to pay, rather than the greatest as in a traditional auction, for a 
fixed amount of goods or services.  In an attempt to resist convention, Google 
used a reverse auction in its initial public stock offering.246  The initial price 
for a single share was set at the lowest price that all shares would be sold 
following a bidding process.247 
Given a reverse auction’s potential advantages, states and cities ought to 
consider how such an approach may rationalize the subsidy allocation 
process when attempting to influence business-location decisions. 
A state or local agency could implement a reverse auction following the 
legislature’s and executive’s budget allocation.  The agency would issue a 
public notice of available funding.  There would be a deadline for companies 
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to inform the agency of plans to use the subsidy and a disclosure of how much 
subsidy would be needed per job, either created or retained.  Upon allocating 
all of the budget, the agency would award the lowest amount of subsidy per 
job. 
Elected representatives would still largely decide the first principles 
regarding why and whether business incentives should be offered.  Through 
this public process, elected officials would be able to hold hearings, consider 
different perspectives, and decide which metrics would be most important.  
For instance, lawmakers might enact a state residency requirement for any 
new jobs.248 
On the other hand, lawmakers might be concerned that new jobs will go to 
workers already employed, and this might cause them to leave their current 
jobs in search of some other factor, such as better pay, work conditions, or 
commutes.  This could lead lawmakers to avoid a state residency 
requirement.  Whatever the particular metrics or values, having the reverse 
auction design begin at the lawmaking step has the political appeal of 
involving some expression of state or local values, however they are 
expressed. 
Also, the lawmaking process allows additional metrics and expert 
perspectives to be included in the auction design process.  Several metrics 
are articulated in the literature about business location incentives.  They 
include:  (1) frontloading subsidies in the early years after a business location 
decision, (2) including services like job training in addition to money, (3) 
making the subsidies non-refundable (i.e., the state or locality does not need 
to pay out the subsidy in cash), and (4) favoring high-skilled industries over 
retail.249 
Assuming a legislative body decides that it is legitimate to fund business 
incentives for a particular industry—perhaps health care or technology given 
geographic proximity to hospitals and schools—and a set allocation of funds, 
it is still necessary to examine how large companies would be able to game 
the system in deciding between multiple jurisdictions.  For companies 
bidding in multiple jurisdictions, business incentives simply reduce taxes on 
larger employers while existing businesses pay at a higher tax level.  
Solutions to addressing this problem could lie in the collective agreements 
discussed in Part II.B.  For instance, states and cities of a certain size could 
agree not to compete with each other for large employers of a certain size. 
Another challenge is the competition within a jurisdiction to redistribute 
economic development funds from very productive areas to less productive 
ones.  For example, the rise of highly successful metropolitan regions in some 
cases has led to demands from areas with lower productivity for more 
government funding.250  In such cases, states may work to more evenly 
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disperse capital.  To make a reverse auction business-incentive scheme 
politically acceptable to lawmakers from less economically productive areas, 
a compensation scheme or a community benefits agreement approach could 
be implemented to balance out the demands to redistribute scarce economic 
development funds. 
Payments to towns and landowners in exchange for accepting undesirable 
land uses are not unprecedented.  New York’s largest landfills, for instance, 
are located in the Finger Lakes region of New York.251  Through a host of 
community benefits agreements pertaining to one landfill in Seneca Falls, the 
town receives 5.5 percent of the landfill’s revenue.252  Paying less developed 
parts of a state in exchange for permitting a state to engage in a reverse 
auction for business incentives would make such a program palatable 
statewide. 
3.  Step Two:  The Clawback Provision 
Next, once all available subsidies are allocated, the agency would contract 
with the successful bidders.  This is where recapture mechanisms linked to a 
specific number of created or retained jobs would be included in the awarded 
contracts.  This allows governments to claw back funds spent on companies 
that accept subsidies but still reduce their workforces.  Governmental subsidy 
administrators may deter company flight based on particular community 
economic needs. 
If businesses fail to successfully do what they say they will do, the 
contractual remedy will be available to claw back incentives and cancel 
contracts.253  States and cities have used clawbacks effectively to recapture 
incentive payments when companies do not deliver the jobs numbers that 
they promise.254  In exchange for government subsidies, Intel regularly 
reports its progress in hiring and retaining workers to the New Mexico 
government.255  Under a clawback regime, the business must repay some of 
the original incentive if it shutters or lets employees go during a specific 
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timeframe.256  The contract phase is an opportunity for agencies to influence 
private companies through public law norms.257 
4.  Oversight:  Role of the Public 
Once contracts are in place, monitoring is primarily up to the agencies.  
Agencies tasked with monitoring economic development programs face 
challenges in ensuring that programs function.258  Typically, agencies that 
are spread thin lack the resources for monitoring.  Legislatures and 
executives would need to consider the monitoring responsibilities of agencies 
when allocating funds for incentive programs.  The public could assist with 
the monitoring process. 
The intended beneficiaries of economic development incentive programs 
are constituent workers who risk losing their current jobs and those who may 
be hired in the future.  If constituents are included in the monitoring process 
through a private right of action, the monitoring agency can share the burden 
of oversight.  The contract drafting process can include a third-party 
beneficiary provision allowing administrative challenges if the company fails 
to deliver on its contractual obligations. 
5.  Additional Concerns:  Setting Further Metrics 
Beyond the two-step proposal, there are additional concerns that agencies 
ought to consider when subsidizing private economic development.  Once 
the legislature allocates funds, the government, through the legislature or a 
state or local administrative agency, sets metrics.  The metrics determine how 
and upon what conditions the bidding company will receive subsidies.  Now, 
as shown through the Washington State aerospace subsidy example and 
others, the task of setting metrics for economic development is not easy.  
Further, because economic development activities are not well studied, it can 
be challenging to set meaningful metrics. 
Currently, metrics for economic development programs focus on 
somewhat obvious numbers, like the number of full-time equivalent jobs 
created or retained, the investment in capital equipment or real property, and 
the spending on local infrastructure.  In some cases, such as Washington 
State’s, the focus on keeping a particular production program failed to keep 
and grow jobs due to the inclusion of robot manufacturing.259  There are 
several additional metrics to consider when evaluating whether a program is 
likely to be successful. 
Economic data indicates that economic subsidies are most effective when 
implemented in particular ways.  These include:  (1) when subsidies are front-
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 259. See supra note 6. 
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loaded in the first couple years after a move or expansion; (2) when subsidies 
are focused on certain high-skilled positions (subsidies targeting job 
expansion in low-wage industries like retail tend to be less effective); (3) 
when tax credits are nonrefundable and unlimited in terms of budget 
allocation; and (4) when subsidies are geared towards services like 
customized job training rather than cash.260  As Bartik points out, the lack of 
data available to study private economic development makes disclosure 
requirements in law even more critical.261 
a.  Front-Load Subsidies in Early Years 
When designing metrics for the type of subsidy to offer a private business, 
state and local agencies and legislatures should front-load the subsidy in the 
first few years of a business’s relocation or expansion.  The reasons for front-
loading incentives are easy to understand.  Businesses assign a discount rate 
to future years’ incentives.262  Incentives offered in the first year, or the first 
five years, are worth much more than those offered in future years.263 
A bright spot is that the data indicates that, as of 2015, front-loading is 
already happening.264  Moving forward, states and cities should set metrics 
that focus on the incentive’s first, or first five, years.  These first five years 
are most important for businesses in assessing where to move or keep jobs.  
Incentives offered seven to ten years into the future tend not to impact 
business decision-making.265  Plus, incentives extended into the future can 
be very costly to the government and public. 
b.  High-Skilled vs. Retail Jobs  
A significant criticism of government incentives to private businesses is 
that the inducements further low-wage, low-skill, part-time employment.266  
Recent scholarship touts programs that place focus on career-oriented jobs in 
manufacturing and other skilled sectors.267  Luckily, the data suggests that 
the incentive programs of states and cities are focused more on 
manufacturing and other skilled areas of work, including technology.268 
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There are two ways to ensure that incentives produce growth across an 
economy.  The first is to define the industries that can use the incentive 
program.269  The second is to assign a multiplier to the jobs produced or 
retained by the incentive.270 
Congress specifies industries and projects through the private activity bond 
program.271  This approach has given Congress tools to respond to natural 
disasters and economic collapse.272  Such a response could be adopted in the 
proposed bidding program and allow for legislatures to prioritize certain 
projects based on responses to current needs. 
Using economic multipliers seems attractive.  Both the Texas and Florida 
deal-closing funds require an economic multiplier of 6:1 and 5:1 
respectively.273  The theory underlying this policy is that an economic 
multiplier accounts for the recycling of dollars within a community.274  
Simply put, it is difficult to manage this.  It largely will be up to agencies 
reviewing bids to ensure that the economic multiples are delivered. 
c.  Make Tax Subsidies Nonrefundable and  
Set Caps on Amount of Incentive 
Currently, many tax-incentive programs are uncapped.  A related issue is 
that subsidies are frequently refundable.275  Bartik observes that incentives 
are refundable to businesses too frequently, meaning that the state or city has 
to pay the business cash.276  
For example, in the case of the Tesla Gigafactory project, Tesla receives 
refundable tax credits.277  If Tesla were to apply for a tax refund, the state 
would pay the credits, valued at $1.4 billion, in cash.278  This payment, which 
would further deplete public coffers, would do nothing to address the 
affordable housing crisis and overcrowded schools in Nevada.279  Without 
eliminating the refundability of tax incentives, and setting a reasonable cap 
on the total amount of subsidy, the public is not protected. 
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As a threshold matter, a bidding program imposes a cap by allocating only 
a limited amount of funds.  The refund matter can be addressed through 
drafting the incentive program.  Thus, these two issues can be addressed. 
d.  Include Services like Job Training in Addition to Cash 
While the data is not conclusive, states spend very little on job training 
programs.280  Some data suggests that services like job training can be more 
cost-effective than cash incentives to businesses.281  Job training may not be 
effective in addressing the displacement of existing small businesses.282  
Some states like New York283 and Maine284 are taking steps to either pay for 
higher education or cover the cost of student loan debt, thus easing some pain 
points related to financing an education.  But it is likely that more can be 
done. 
B.  The “Publicization” of Private Economic Development 
Lawmakers using legislation to increase economic development activity 
do not always clearly further public goals and purposes.  This creates both 
challenges and opportunities.285  As Jody Freeman suggests, there are public 
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law tools available, such as budgeting, regulating, and contracting, to bring 
private actors under the frame of public law norms.286 
There are several reasons for lawmakers, public policy advocates, and 
legal scholars to focus on the publicization of private economic development 
activity.  The government’s current doctrinal and constitutional constraints 
on private economic development activity are wholly inadequate to constrain 
spending in this area.287  A lack of constraints on government spending for 
private economic development activity is correlated with higher state and 
local debt.288 
Freeman identifies three factors that should be considered when deciding 
on whether a function should involve publicization289:  “(1) the relative 
precision with which a service can be specified and the extent of the 
provider’s discretion, (2) the potential impact on the consumer, and (3) the 
government’s motivation for privatizion.”290  Arguments for services being 
publicized are strongest where “services are highly contentious, value-laden, 
and hard to specify, and when providers enjoy significant discretion; when 
services affect vulnerable populations with few exit options and little 
political clout; and/or when the motivation for privatization is explicitly 
ideological or clearly corrupt.”291 
The case for the publicization of private economic development activity is 
strong.  First, as demonstrated in the examples above, private economic 
development activity is very difficult to specify with particularity, and 
companies have sole discretion in most cases about how to develop their 
businesses, including the decision to leave after receiving public funds.292  
Second, workers and their families are increasingly immobile, while 
companies and their capital are very mobile.293  Workers are vulnerable and, 
especially in postindustrial urban and rural areas, have few job 
alternatives.294  Third, political self-preservation typically motivates public 
support of private economic development activity.295  This motivation alone 
is suspect. 
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IV.  APPLYING THE TWO-STEP PROPOSAL 
A.  The Washington State Example Revisited 
The failure of the Washington State aerospace subsidy extension was 
largely because the statutory metrics focused on the development of a new 
airplane wing manufacturing line.296  The number of jobs for human workers 
was not included in the statute.297  Boeing could keep the tax credit because 
it constructed the wing manufacturing plant.298  However, Boeing reduced 
its workforce in Washington State by developing robotics and scaling back 
workers on other manufacturing lines. 
How would the proposed two-step bidding process address the 
Washington State failure?  It would do so in three ways.  First, through the 
budgeting process, legislators would have a public opportunity to debate the 
amount of funds that should be set aside for private companies.  Second, 
through the setting of metrics, legislators, the executive branch, and 
constituents could address the issue of maintaining jobs and not just new real 
property investment.  Finally, through the contracting process, the agency 
charged with selection and monitoring could ensure that the company was 
competitive in its incentives proposal.  Through budgeting, regulation, and 
contracting, public law norms could improve the incentive allocation 
process. 
A company as large and important as Boeing would certainly have 
influence at each stage.  However, the procedural bidding process would shed 
light on a currently opaque subsidization process.  For instance, information 
about the actual benefits of the Boeing tax deal was not evident until the 
company was required to report its 2015 tax savings.299  The current process 
did not even set jobs targets.300  It is possible that other employers could have 
made better use of the public funds—whether they be new employers from 
out of state, neighboring tech employers in Seattle, or small businesses.301 
There would be a public conversation about the amount of the subsidy 
extended in a bidding process.  The Washington State aerospace subsidy is 
the largest state transfer to private industry in U.S. history.302  A bidding 
process, in which other companies would have had the chance to meet or beat 
Boeing’s hiring plans, would have improved an otherwise broken process. 
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The agency required to oversee the economic development could share its 
monitoring obligations by including a private right of action to third-party 
beneficiaries.  It is true that there were challenges to the Boeing subsidy, but 
the challenges were not in state court and not based on the company’s failure 
to meet its obligations under contract.303  As demonstrated above, court 
challenges based on public purpose doctrine are unlikely to be successful.304  
But a group of intended beneficiaries bringing a claim based on contract law 
is another story.  Individual workers, groups of workers, or unions 
representing workers could have brought a contract law claim when Boeing 
reduced jobs following its receipt of subsidy dollars.305 
B.  Florida and Texas 
A bidding regime would slightly alter deal-closing funds in Florida, Texas, 
and other states that have similar programs.  The main change under the 
bidding regime is that states like Florida and Texas would accept company 
bids rather than approach the companies directly.  The state legislature would 
still approve an annual (or biennial) budget for the program.  The governor’s 
office, or monitoring agency, would still set regulation through use of 
metrics.  This is currently done through an enabling statute.  Individual 
company contracts and monitoring would continue with a few changes.  
States could compare information about subsidies extended on a per job 
basis.  Small- and medium-sized companies could compete more easily with 
larger employers when seeking government funds. 
Table 1, below, compares the Washington State aerospace extension, the 
Florida Quick Action Closing Fund, the Texas Enterprise Fund, and the two-
step company bidding proposal. 
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Table 1:  WA,306 FL,307 and TX308 Compared to Two-Step Company Bidding 
Proposal 
 WA FL  TX  Two-Step Proposal 
Amount $9 billion $225.5 million 
$516 
million 
Set by state or 
local 
legislature  
Metrics New facility 5:1 6:1 
Multiplier, 
jobs, and 
other metrics 
Target Aerospace sector 
Companies 
planning to 
relocate
Companies 
planning to 
relocate
Set by 
legislature or 
agency 
Oversight 
Boeing must 
site aerospace 
manufacturing 
program in 
state to keep 
receiving 
funds
Companies 
must meet 
job targets 
to keep 
receiving 
funds 
Companies 
must meet 
job targets 
to keep 
receiving 
funds 
Company 
reporting and 
subject to 
claw back if 
jobs targets 
not met 
C.  Capture, Gaming, and Other Arguments Against the Proposal 
Any administrative process is subject to capture by regulators, especially 
one involving public spending for private business development.  Of course, 
companies will make efforts to game the system by using metrics to win bids.  
There are a number of ways to guard against this. 
The two-step bid proposal itself works to break down the capture process:  
if companies are not made offers by the government but are instead required 
to bid, then the process will likely be more efficient from the start.  
Companies seeking to bid can also influence the metric setting, or regulation, 
and the contracting parts of the process.  However, there are checks 
throughout the bidding process with public processes at each step, public 
norms of accountability, transparency, and rationality, as well as the principle 
of due process. 
Certain requirements ought to limit gaming, which would lower its 
likelihood.  For instance, a company must demonstrate that it is considering 
a location in another jurisdiction to bid on the available funds. 
Another way to address the issue of gaming is through blind bidding.  By 
blind bidding, companies would bid for the least amount of government 
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subsidy per job without disclosing the company name.309  Such a program 
embraces what Mariana Mazzucato has described as government support for 
business; the state stepping in with needed investment the private sector will 
not provide.310  While some large employers might make themselves known 
by certain types of proposals, as is likely with any public process, all 
qualifying projects could be entered into a lottery and selected at random. 
It is unlikely that this process would entirely eliminate public outrage 
towards employers that accept subsidies and then leave.  However, a bidding 
mechanism with an opportunity to address recapture of a subsidy for 
company nonperformance affords a clear opportunity for the government and 
community to address outrage around employers fleeing after receiving 
subsidies. 
There is a chance that critics still will cry foul about a process involving 
government agencies where the names of bidders are disclosed.  Two 
solutions to this problem stick out:  first, names of bidders could be sealed; 
and second, once eligible bids are assessed, subsidies could be allocated at 
random based on funds available. 
D.  Federal Reforms, Next Steps 
The focus of some reform suggestions center on efforts at the federal 
level.311  While they are important, and certainly could go a long way to 
improving the efforts states and cities make to encourage local private 
economic development, they are outside the scope of this Article. 
Furthermore, if anything, the floodgates are wide open for federal-level 
regulation.  With the Treasury’s recent proposed regulations of the 
Opportunity Zone program,312 investors will be able to avoid capital gains 
on real estate invested for at least ten years in a specific area.313  Maps of the 
Opportunity Zones have already been drawn.314  One report has suggested 
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that the Treasury do the following to implement the Opportunity Zone tax 
credits appropriately, including:  (1) target the right places using better data; 
(2) use appropriate financing, monitoring compliance, and mandating 
transparency; (3) guard against federal subsidy abuse; and (4) evaluate the 
program to ensure it achieves its goals.315 
The author remains skeptical about the likelihood that state or federal 
courts will reinterpret the substance of the public purpose doctrine or the state 
constitutional prohibitions on gifts, loans, or extension of the government’s 
credit for private business.316  The Supreme Court took steps to further the 
public’s understanding of what constitutes “public use,”317 which is related 
to public purpose.  Whether or not that will shift with the reconfiguration of 
the Court to a solid five conservative vote majority remains to be seen. 
Were courts to adopt a more robust analysis of what constitutes a public 
purpose, there are some guides.  There are a number of factors that courts can 
use to assess whether a project fits within a public purpose:  (1) safety 
precautions of the project; (2) waste disposal plans; (3) traffic; (4) burden of 
increased population on existing government services; (5) availability of 
housing; and (6) psychological tensions caused by the project.318  With the 
possible exception of the sixth factor, most of these factors certainly fit within 
a specific analysis that a court could engage in at a fact-finding stage to assess 
whether a public purpose exists.  The difficulty, however, is perhaps in 
courts’ reluctance to legislate.  Courts tend to defer to legislatures, especially 
on social laws.319  In other words, courts rely on the legislative check to curb 
such oversubsidization. 
In a related area, courts are reluctant to overturn state and local government 
efforts to regulate development because of gentrification claims.  One recent 
opinion on this topic, issued by a court in New York State, highlights this 
issue.  In Ordonez v. City of New York,320 a state court judge combined two 
separate challenges to zoning approvals brought by longtime residents of rent 
regulated housing in East Harlem and Brooklyn.321  In both instances, 
residents challenged the city’s analysis of the socioeconomic impact of 
zoning approvals on longtime, low-income renters.322  In each case, city 
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officials followed environmental assessments guidelines in analyzing how 
zoning decisions would impact the various areas.323 
Since the city followed the guidelines, the court would not overturn the 
city’s final approval of each zoning application based on claims that new 
development would have significant harms on longtime residents.324  Such a 
decision reveals the challenges that gentrification places on residents and the 
reality that state courts are likely to uphold state and local government 
agencies’ decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts and lawmakers have much to grapple with in constraining 
government support for private economic development activity.  Studies 
demonstrate that the public purpose doctrine and state constitutional 
prohibitions are wholly inadequate at limiting the ability of state and local 
legislators to buy jobs for their constituents.  This Article proposes an 
auction-based approach to rationalize the job-generation process. 
Under this Article’s proposed two-step auction process, disruptions to 
communities are likely.  Few legal remedies are available to longtime 
residents at risk of displacement.  But as areas grow and develop, there are 
perhaps opportunities for middle class families to return to areas, like urban 
cores, that they have fled.  And revitalized job opportunities may allow poor 
families—especially in African American communities—to move into the 
middle class. 
In light of this Article’s discussion about state and local officials spending 
public funds to retain and attract employment, one wonders about the future 
of work and the government’s role in transferring funds to workers.  There 
are issues related to how governments ensure that workers have money to 
consume while also ensuring a healthy, dignified, and productive society.  In 
engaging in job buying, lawmakers have adopted a supply-side, neoliberal 
belief that it is better to spend public funds to attempt to attract high paying 
jobs than to use public resources to expand direct payments to workers 
through social or economic programs. 
More fundamentally, there is the question of what types of jobs 
governments can attract and how private sector employment will develop.  A 
shift to a service-based economy and the robotization of certain 
manufacturing or dangerous work will continue to mean that the work that 
families relied on for generations will no longer exist.  Workers must 
confront that reality.  Governments already deal with displaced factories, the 
closure of which eliminates property tax, sales tax, and income tax revenue. 
Additional direct and indirect economic benefits occur through the injection 
of payroll into a local economy and the multiplier effect that occurs when 
workers eat at restaurants, shop at grocery stores, buy or rent homes, and 
consume local goods and services. 
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The public policy imperative for lawmakers to buy jobs is unlikely to 
change.  The force and power of constituents’ need for work and income is 
so strong.  Because it is unlikely that spending on private economic 
development will subside on its own, a legal constraint is necessary to check 
lawmakers.  Because it has proven too difficult to substantively constrain 
spending, a procedural check is the more obvious solution.  This Article has 
presented a two-step proposal.  The first step involves a reverse-auction 
process to ensure the least amount of public subsidy is used per job.  The 
second step is a clawback provision that allows the public to recapture 
subsidies should agreed-upon job targets not be achieved. 
Some observers may argue that an auction approach unnecessarily 
complicates a simple negotiation process for businesses and governments to 
reach agreement on subsidy terms.  A bid process, some may think, could 
chill private sector participation in job creation through new commercial real 
estate development.  Even simpler, a jurisdiction that adopts such a process 
could drive businesses across city or state lines into an area with fewer 
regulations. 
This criticism is certainly a fair one to consider.  Government is frequently 
characterized—often deservedly—for moving too slow for the pace of 
business.  However, in the reverse-auction scenario posed by this Article, the 
idea is to accomplish the dual goals of government inducing businesses to 
hire workers, grow operations, and spend money on office and plant 
facilities, while also checking potential overspending of scarce public funds. 
A related criticism is that the possible programs legislated in the reverse-
auction process could limit innovation.  If the goal is to get companies to 
increase their innovativeness, having the strictures of government-imposed 
metrics could be too limiting.  In the Boeing example, perhaps developing 
robot technology for airplane wing or fuselage manufacturing actually 
improves the process.  A reformed, more restrictive bidding process could 
unnecessarily limit companies’ ability to develop new manufacturing 
techniques and processes. 
The answer likely lies somewhere in between.  Lawmakers must consider 
what the government’s role is in developing industry such that constituent 
employment remains fruitful and robust.  Exploring the values involved in 
work—both financial and, in some cases, moral—ought to occur through 
debate among elected representatives.  Courts likely are better left to 
determine the satisfactory compliance with procedural requirements than in 
making substantive decisions about how and when lawmakers can use public 
money to buy jobs. 
